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The Australian Football League (AFL) is the premier competition for the sport of 
Australian Rules football. The game has historic significance, financial importance, 
and is a cultural institution in Australia. Unfortunately, there has been limited 
empirical research related to coaching within the sport. The little research that has 
been completed highlights the coaches’ box as the most challenging environment for 
an AFL coach; in particular, decision-making and the ability to facilitate this when 
emotions are running high during the match. The purpose of this research study was 
to examine coaches’ decision-making on match day using the Naturalistic Decision 
Making (NDM) framework. In doing so, this study included the use of semi-structured 
interviews and stimulated recall interviews to collect data. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted one-on-one with a male head coach who had a coaching history 
spanning over 16 years and 11 years coaching either semi-professionally or 
professionally as a head coach. In addition semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with nine male players, seven of which were currently contracted by an 
AFL club and two other players had previously been contracted. The players were 
split into three focus groups and two male runners who were used on match day to 
pass messages from the coach to the players formed one focus group. The 
interviews were completed to determine the perceptions of the head coach, players, 
and runners regarding the influence a head coach’s decisions had on match day. In 
addition, three stimulated recall interviews were conducted with the head coach 
across the span of three games. The purpose of these stimulated recall interviews, 
was to describe and understand the critical or important decisions made. The data 
was qualitatively analysed using a deductive-inductive approach creating ‘meaning 
units’, which were categorised and organised hierarchically. Two key themes 
emerged from the data analysis, First, the data revealed head coach decisions were 
perceived to influence the game in the context of retaining or regaining control of the 
match, particularly when the game was not going to plan. Second, the data revealed 
a two-part assessment process when assessing a situational problem to describe 
and understand head coach decision making. The two parts of assessing a 
Abstract 
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situational problem were: Situational Story and Player Knowledge. Situational Story 
is about scanning the situation, framing the problem, and understanding the trend of 
the game, allowing the coach to build up a ‘story’ to understand the situational 
problem. Player Knowledge represents knowing the history of an individual player’s 
role, position, and footballing capabilities, which was key to making the decision as it 
helped the coach to finalise or complete the slow interactive script and form the 
appropriate mental model for subsequent decision making. The information, 
gathered from continuously scanning the situation, combined with the knowledge the 
coach had on individual players, strengthened the assessment, and allowed for the 
decision to be made. This research contributes to the literature by providing an 
understanding of a coach’s decision making process throughout a match and 
potentially adding to the description that there are two levels of semi-deliberative 
decision making on matchday. Furthermore this is the first study to investigate 
decision making within a professional Australian Rules Football match. There are 
several implications for coach development from this study. Coach developers can 
potentially break up the formal learning process into two sections: (i) Describing and 
Understanding how a story is built; and (ii) Understanding the importance and the 
type of player knowledge needed to help take the decision. Formal learning can 
consist of discussions with coaches, designing mock scenarios and helping to 
identify and match player capabilities to situational problems. Coach developers can 
use experiential learning and reflection, to intentionally build on player’s historicity 
and deliberately add depth of knowledge. The findings of this study indicated that the 
coach’s decisions could influence the game when trying to regain control of 
situational problems. By understanding the two part assessment process based 
around these situational problems, coach educators might develop learning 
programs based on scanning and/or player knowledge. Knowing what information is 
scanned helps understand what forms a situational problem and can help the coach 
to recognise situational problems sooner. By understanding the role historicity plays 
in allowing a coach to make decisions, learning programs can focus on improving a 
coach’s deeper understanding of player’s role, position and footballing capabilities. 
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This knowledge can finalise the coach’s script and make the decision quicker, 
increasing the chance of influencing the game. The findings support existing 
literature in relation to how the coach cognitively operates within the Naturalistic 
Decision Making paradigm. In particular, describing coach’s decision making as 
semi-deliberative, coming to the most appropriate decision on an ongoing basis, the 
use of a slow interactive script, story building and feature matching. The limitations of 
the study included: (i) the number of players per focus groups, due to availability of 
players the numbers were unable to be organised to optimise discussions between 
players: (ii) the immediacy of the recall, which occurred two days after the game due 
to logistical reasons, where ideally this would have occurred sooner: and (iii) not 
taking notes when reviewing the transcriptions, limited the ability to get a sense of 
scope and identify occurring topics. Future research might consider additional case 
studies within the sport and across different sports to provide a stronger evidence 
base for understanding how coaches make decisions within a match. In particular 
whether or not there is merit to different levels of semi-deliberative decision making 
and what factors make decisions more and less deliberative.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Australian Football League (AFL) is the pinnacle and premier competition 
of the sport of Australian Rules football. The game is played with a leather oval ball 
on an oval field. There are 36 players on the field at any one time (18 players per 
team) and each team has an additional 4 interchange players on the bench. Players 
can move to any point on the field, with no zones or off side rules. The game is 
broken up into 4 quarters lasting 20 minutes of playing time; meaning every time the 
ball stops or goes out of play, the time stops. Players score between 4 posts located 
down each end of the field, two tall central posts and two smaller posts, one either 
side of the taller ones (As seen in Appendix A). Teams aim to score by kicking the 
football in between the taller middle posts for a goal that earns 6 points. If they miss 
to the side, but in between the big and small posts one point is scored. If the ball hits 
the big post 1 point is given. If the ball hits the small posts the ball is out of play. 
Presiding over play, there are three field umpires, four boundary umpires and two 
goal umpires. Each team is also allowed two runners who can run on to the field and 
pass on messages and instructions from the coaching team to the players. The 
coaching team sits in a “box” located in the stands, allowing for a bird’s eye view of 
game. The coaches’ box is a small confined space that generally fits 4-5 assistant 
coaches and technical support staff who provide statistical data and cut live footage 
for the coaches to give immediate feedback in the three breaks during the match. 
With the collection of bodies in a small space, and the mix of opinions all directed at 
the head coach, the most effective decision is needed to influence and direct the 
outcome of the game. 
Winning the game and ultimately the AFL Grand Final is the pinnacle of 
Australian Rules football. Losing games and limited growth or success often 
correlates with the sacking of a head coach, along with negative financial, cultural 
and commercial decline (e.g., loss of sponsors and/or members). The head coach 
plays a large role within the AFL, which as an organisation is historically significant, 
financially important and socially relevant.  
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The coach has been central to Australian Football since 1858 when the first 
game was recorded in Victoria (Australian Football League [AFL], n.d.). The game 
continued to grow and in 1986 the Victorian Football League (VFL) was formed 
(Australian Football League [AFL], n.d.). In 1990, due to the expansion of the league 
too other states of Australia, the league changed its name from the VFL to the AFL 
(Australian Football League [AFL], n.d.). As the game grew, so did the stature and 
importance of the coach and the amount of assistant coaches and support staff.  The 
increased number of physical bodies has had a concurrent effect on the number of 
opinions within the football department, specifically in the coaches’ box on match 
day. Taking the best decision from the mix of valuable opinions, in short time-frames, 
within the confines of a coaches’ box can influence the outcome of the game.  
In 2002 the AFL created its own independent association devoted to coaches 
called the Australian Football League Coaches Association (AFLCA), which provides 
support for all coaches within the AFL on various levels ("Who we are," 2009). 
Currently the ALF has 18 clubs within its competition with each club consisting of a 
head coach and an estimated 150 assistant coaches ("Who we are," 2009) in 
addition to a variety of other professionals such as physiologists, psychologists, 
managers and statisticians. All of these professionals add to the mix of opinions and 
data that potentially influence the decision making of a head coach. 
The AFL’s annual report for the 2014 season highlights how financially 
important and socially relevant the competition is with the total attendance for its 
home and away season being 6,402,010 people with an average attendance of 
32,333 (Australian Football League [AFL], 2014). In 2010, the attendance figures 
were the third highest in the world for a professional sports competition, with only the 
American NFL competition and Germany’s Bundesliga ahead (Australian Football 
League [AFL], 2010). These attendance figures highlight the demand for AFL by the 
Australian public that, in turn, promotes revenue through sponsorship and broadcast 
deals.  In 2010, the AFL reported a record revenue of $335.8 million and in 2011 
announced a new media broadcast deal worth $1.25 billion each year for 5 years 
from the 2012 premiership season onwards (Witham, 2011). Total head coach were 
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estimated at $9 million in 2014, which averages out to be about $525,000 per head 
coach, with assistant coaches averaging $125,000 (Sheahan, 2011).  
The head coach is the face of the club and they have a responsibility to 
represent the club to the public and commercial partners through press conferences, 
newspaper articles, events and functions. With the paying public listening to what is 
said and millions of dollars invested in the game, the coach is constantly under the 
microscope; accountable when not performing and hailed when successful.  
With the status and pressure of an AFL head coach being so high, Mallett, 
Rossi, and Tinning (2007) have examined coaching knowledge, learning and 
mentoring in the AFL. They found that the head coach was open and passionate to 
developing their coaching practice, by using respected and trusted mentors, peers 
and other professionals to assist in their learning including a “personal dynamic 
social network that continued to evolve” (Mallett et al., 2007, pp. 6-7). The landscape 
of coach learning in the AFL is “serendipitous and opportunistic” rather than being 
“structured and systematic” (p.7) and AFL coaches are not being challenged. Their 
coaching practice is only affirmed by their own observations and then only over a 
period of time do coaches refine their own coaching behaviours. In relation to 
coaches’ decision making, this poses the question: are coaches refining their own 
decision-making behaviours? And if not, what learning is taking place to improve 
coach decision making on match day? 
Although coach learning in the AFL is limited, coaches are still passionate 
about developing their practice, however the biggest concern and “undoubtedly, the 
most challenging task for coaches was the coaching box on match day” (Mallett et 
al., 2007, p. 6). Suggesting it may not be performing optimally with the “lack of clarity 
of roles and constructive feedback are barriers to effective functioning” (p. 6). 
Furthermore, the “ability to control emotions in the box was thought important in 
facilitating effective decision making” (p. 6). It is precisely these decisions, made 
under pressure by the head coach in the box on match day, that this study is 
concerned with. The aim is to describe and understand how an AFL head coach 
makes decisions in the coaches’ box on match day.  
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Aim and Significance  
In this study, I will use the naturalistic decision-making (NDM) framework 
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001; Lyle, 2010) to examine the decision making 
of an Australian Rules football head coach on match day. To achieve this aim an 
attempt will be made to establish whether or not head coach’s decisions influence 
the game or at least are perceived to impact the game and; second, by examining 
the coach the aim is to describe and understand how an Australian Rules football 
head coach makes decisions in the coaches’ box throughout a live match within a 
regular season. This line of research has the potential to inform coach education and 
professional development opportunities for understanding and improving the 
decision-making capabilities of Australian Rules coaches on match day.  
These aims are significant because they might potentially provide coach 
educators the ability to know what to teach novice (high performance) coaches in 
order to advance their development and education, to improve their ability to make 
decisions under pressure. These advancements aim to improve the quality of 
coaching and better inform the decisions made by the coach in a semi-deliberative 
environment. Improving the quality of coaching and decisions made on match day 
could help make for more competitive games and potentially improve player 
performance hopefully strengthening the game financially and socially, and ultimately 
grow the game.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Match Day Coaching 
There have been various projects conducted for match day coaching (e.g., 
Boutmans & Swillen, 1989; Debanne & Fontayne, 2009; Gilbert, Trudel, & Haughian, 
1999; Smith & Cushion, 2006; Trudel, Côté, & Bernard, 1996), with a focus on coach 
behaviours at youth level (Smith & Cushion, 2006; Trudel et al., 1996), cognitive 
management (Debanne & Fontayne, 2009), Interactive Decision Making with youth 
coaches (Gilbert et al., 1999) and recently Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) in 
high performance team sport coaching (Harvey, Lyle, & Muir, 2015). Magazine and 
newsletter articles briefly cover various sports talking about coaching on the sideline, 
during the match and at half time (Anderson, 2007; Armour, 1986; Gordon, 1994; 
Heil & Soter, 2009; Launder & Piltz, 1999; Oxenham, 1998; American Sport 
Education Program [ASEP], 2002). With regard to AFL coaches, there have been 
newspaper articles on AFL head coaches (e.g., Roos, 2011) and empirical research 
reports (e.g., Mallett et al., 2007) highlighting the need for research to be conducted 
into the coaches’ box on match day. Television features provide insights on match 
day highlighting how the coach communicates to other coaches within the box and 
other staff on the bench, and provides a small glimpse of decision-making behavior 
under pressure. These insightful but token examples reinforce performance coaching 
being a cognitive activity (Mallett et al., 2007). Overall, there is plenty of interest in 
and growing acceptance of match day coaching as a cognitive (decision making) 
activity but there has been limited research to date.  
Coach Decision-Making.  
Coaches’ decision making focuses on three types of decision making 
categories and understanding where they fit into coaching practice, if at all. The 
three category types are deliberative, non-deliberative, and semi-deliberative 
decision making. Deliberative decision making is related to time being available, 
where the coach can evaluate his/her options, therefore deliberating on the decision 
to be made. Non-deliberative decision making, is the coach having no time to 
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evaluate the options, needing to make a split decision. Semi-deliberative decision 
making still requires a quick decision to be made, however there is time available to 
deliberate (Lyle, 2010). 
Deliberative and semi-deliberative decision making are the most appropriate 
categories to describe coaches’ decision making (Lyle, 2010). Non-deliberative, 
however, is justified as not fitting into this category because although decision 
making has an element of time pressure, there is “no suggestion that the coach’s 
behavior is (or should be!) completely without conscious deliberation” (Lyle, 2010, p. 
28). Decisions concerning what to plan, schedule, and who to allocate resources to 
is an example of deliberative decision making (Lyle, 2002). Deliberative decision 
making can also be termed as Classical Decision Making (CDM) which is “typically 
applied during planning, implementation and review stages of practice to progress 
their athletes (or clients) toward set goals” (Abraham & Collins, 2011, p. 374). 
Although there is a school of thought suggesting that CDM is not the preferred 
paradigm to best describe coaches’ decision making (Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 
2010), it can be argued that it does have a place within coaching practice 
(deliberation) as it plays a key role with the implementation and initial development of 
mental models (Abraham & Collins, 2011).   
Semi-deliberative decision making is specific to Naturalistic Decision Making 
(NDM) (Lyle, 2010) and coaching practice in terms of “coming to the most 
appropriate decision on an ongoing basis” (p. 29). Which is argued to be “crucial at 
key moments in training and games” (Abraham & Collins, 2011, p. 377). Coming to 
the most appropriate decision is achieved through the hierarchical organisation of 
mental models, which for coaches is “nested in nature” (p. 558). In other words, 
existing mental models are used as a starting point in finding a solution to a problem 
and further ideas of how to solve the problem stem from this nested mental model 
(Abraham et al., 2006). This cognitive process links directly to the role CDM plays in 
strengthening those mental models. For example, continuing with the story, the 
coach made the change to play Fred with Bob and he perceived the decision to 
work. Now the coach has a model of when it is raining. Bob and Fred can work 
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together to create scoring opportunities. Decision making plays an important part in 
everyday coaching practice and both CDM and NDM have a place within the 
coaching domain (Abraham & Collins, 2011). In the next section, I will discuss both 
NDM and CDM theories and explain there appropriateness to the coaching domain 
and how they impact on coaching practice.  
Naturalistic Decision Making 
This section on Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) defines and describes 
NDM, including its history and explaining its appropriateness to sports coaching. The 
related theme of intuition will be explained and how this forms the basis of the most 
recognised NDM model, Recognition Primed Decision-Making (RPD). The RPD 
model will be explained and explored to understand how it relates if at all to sports 
coaching.  
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) focuses on the experienced decision 
maker (Lyle, 2010; Ross, Shafer, & Klein, 2006) or the proficient decision maker 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001), and aims to describe and understand how experts use their 
experience or expertise to take decisions within their specific domain that is 
meaningful and familiar to them (Lipshitz et al., 2001; Lyle, 2010; Zsambok, 2009). 
Experienced people work as individuals or in groups and operate in dynamic, 
uncertain and often fast-paced environments trying to identify and assess their 
situation (Zsambok, 2009). Coaching in the box on match day might be considered 
to meet these criteria in that it operates with a group of people, by the head coach. 
The coaches’ box is a confined space, where pressure and uncertainty of assessing 
situations and making decisions can be high. This is due to the limited time available 
within the game and the affect the three points (awarded to the wining team) has on 
the team from a historical, financial and social perspective. 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) emerged in 1989 (Klein, 2008) at a 
conference in Dayton (Ohio), which was sponsored by the Army Research Institute 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001). The Army and the Navy showed an interest in decisions made 
under extreme time pressure and uncertain conditions after mistakenly confusing a 
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commercial airliner with a hostile attacker (Klein, 2008). Since then NDM studies 
have expanded throughout different domains and various field settings, e.g., navy 
commanders, jurors, nuclear power plant operators, army small unit leaders, 
anaesthesiologists, airline pilots, nurses and highway engineers (Klein, 2008, p. 
457).  
The appropriateness of NDM to sports coaching has been reported in the 
literature that examines and illustrates how the findings of NDM resonates with semi-
deliberative decision making in coaching practice (Lyle, 2010).  The benefits of 
applying NDM methodologies and themes within the coaching context are 
substantial (Lyle, 2010) not to mention that the “circumstances under which the NDM 
paradigm was most useful mirrored the emerging consensus on coaching practice” 
(p. 39), such as continuously assessing situations and the cognitive organisation of 
an expert coach throughout coaching practice. To add more depth to the standing of 
the NDM paradigm within coaching practice, recent findings situated within training 
sessions and games suggest that “concepts from the NDM paradigm provide a 
suitable framework for analysing and describing the coaches’ decision making 
behavior and a useful tool for interrogating the semi-deliberative decision making 
within a coach’s practice” (Harvey et al., 2015, p. 165).  
An NDM-related theme, by way of expertise, is intuition (Lyle, 2010). Klein 
(2003) and Lyle (2010) both dismiss the notion that intuition is ‘magical’ or ‘creative’, 
instead discussing how intuition develops and is built from our experiences. 
Experience allows the cognitive knowledge structures (also referred to earlier as 
schemata) to link between events and appropriate actions (Lyle, 2010) and intuitive 
actions which Lyle (2002) calls ‘cognitive short cuts’. Recent research (e.g., Harvey 
et al., 2015) has added weight to the cognitive understanding of coach decision 
making within the NDM paradigm. This has been achieved by understanding 
coaches’ use of key attractors (certain events coaches focus on) throughout a 
situation, to recognise (pattern recognition) or frame a problem. Key attractors act as 
catalysts that trigger a decision action once the coach’s threshold is breached. 
Although this plays down intuition in coaches decision making, “intuitive decision 
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making is the basis of Klein’s Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model” (Bossard, 
Kermarrec, Benard, De Loor, & Tisseau, 2009, p. 1) and it is this model that is most 
suited within the NDM perspective (Pliske & Klein, 2003). 
Recognition primed decision-making. The RPD model was established by 
Klein and colleagues (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 1986) to describe what 
people do when they are under time pressure, receive ambiguous information, have 
ill-defined goals, and when conditions are constantly changing (Klein, 2009). The 
model explains how someone uses their expertise to come to good decisions without 
having to weigh up, analyse and compare the options in a deliberate fashion (Klein, 
2008, 2009; Lipshitz, 1993).  
The RPD model is based on experts cognitively moving through three levels 
when making a decision under pressure. Level 1 is labelled ‘simple match’, level 2 
‘diagnose the situation’ and level 3 ‘evaluate course of action’ (Klein, 2009). Simple 
match is concerned with a situation that is recognised and deemed as typical, where 
a straightforward decision is made (Klein, 2009; Macquet, 2009). For example, Bob 
has a game ending injury so the coach replaces Bob with another tall player, as he 
has done many times in his coaching past.  
Level two, diagnosing the situation, means the situation is not a straight-
forward match to a decision and there is uncertainty about the situation being 
experienced. For example, the coach only has one other tall player and he needs 
that particular player to stay in the ruck position (centre of the ground rather than 
near the goals). How will the coach set up his forward line? Does he have a new 
model of what may work? Due to the uncertainty of the decision, the situation needs 
to be diagnosed, and is conducted in two ways; 1) to build a story (story building) or 
2) to identify ‘the relevant features of a situation’ (feature matching) (Klein, 2009). 
The story involves the coach tacitly piecing the events together to make sense of the 
situation. Feature matching frames how the coach understands what has occurred 
(injury, time left in the game etc). It is this ‘diagnosis’ level where links to the 
cognitive management of a sports coach can be made and is discussed below. 
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The third level of evaluating a course of action involves assessing the 
situation through a ‘mental simulation’, to know whether the decision you are going 
to make comes across any problems and whether these problems can be dealt with 
or a new ‘course of action’ is required (Klein, 2009). For example, the coach is 
thinking about playing all small players in the forward line. How will the game play 
out? Will they get out marked? How do they deliver the ball into the forward line? 
According to Lipshitz and Shaul (2009), an expert recognises a situation and 
then by a mental process (involving schemata and mental models), matches the 
specific situations with an appropriate action or patterns that they have previously 
learned (Klein, 2008). This is known as ‘situational awareness’ (Klein et al., 1986). 
Situational awareness is the “skill in making a quick assessment of its situation and 
requirements” (Klein et al., 1986, p. 580) and is conducted through feature matching 
and story building (mentioned above in the ‘diagnosis’ section of the RPD model). 
Lyle (2010) links the building of stories to coaching by stating its importance in novel 
and complex situations. He states “coaching often involves a serial or unfolding set 
of circumstances in training, in competition or in interpersonal interactions. Part of 
the coach’s expertise is to build up a picture, to scenario build” (Lyle, 2010, p. 33).  
Although the cognitive management of a sports coach has been linked to the 
RPD model through its diagnosis level, Lyle (2010) argues that the RPD model is not 
specific to sports coaching due to the complexity of the coaching environment. He 
states that pattern recognition within the RPD is one of ‘typicality’ which leads to 
easier ‘matching’ and that ‘recognition–response is a ‘mechanism’ for coping with 
complexity and limited information, which is not consistent and does not reflect 
coaches decision making (Lyle, 2010). Not dismissing the RPD model altogether, 
Lyle (2010) believes the non-deliberative and semi-deliberative contexts of coaches 
decision making match up the ‘demands’ of the situation with the most appropriate 
action. He believes that it is rare for a coach to have an existing script unless the 
problem at hand is an exact replica calls for a similar response. He argues that the 
complex environment of sports coaching leads to uncertainty, whereby coaches are 
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able to handle this through management (Lyle, 2002) and NDM can help coaches 
cope with the uncertainty.  
Although the RPD model may not fit perfectly into the coaching landscape, 
NDM is still the best paradigm to describe and understand the decisions of a coach 
within coaching practice. The NDM paradigm helps understand the cognitive 
management of a coach when making semi-deliberative decisions, under pressure, 
within time limitations, surrounded by uncertainty in a moment-by-moment basis. 
Decisions are able to be made on an on-going basis due to the hierarchical 
organisation of mental models, which are ‘nested in nature’ (Abraham & Collins, 
2011). While the mental models are nesting they are able to be strengthened by the 
role Classical Decision Making (CDM) plays throughout the coaching process.  
Classical Decision Making 
In this section, I will explain the role Classical Decision Making (CDM) plays 
within the cognitive mechanism of a coach using the Abraham and Collins (2011) 
nested model and where CDM fits in relation to sports coaching. Throughout this 
explanation I will link CDM to NDM. As mentioned earlier, CDM can be directly linked 
with deliberative decision making, meaning the coach can deliberate on decisions, 
because he/she has time to plan implement and review components of their practice 
(Abraham & Collins, 2011). This ability to deliberate allows CDM to play an integral 
part in strengthening the mental models, which improves decision making under 
pressure in a naturalistic environment. 
Classical Decision Making and Naturalistic Decision Making combine under 
the Professional Judgement Decision Making banner to form the nested model. This 
came about from Abraham and Collins (2011) raising concerns of coaching literature 
becoming too broad, covering too many fields and not impacting coach education. 
The nested model is a practical model, where the two paradigms (CDM & NDM) 
operate within separate parts of coaching practice however, are just as important as 
each other and are linked through the principles of expertise.  
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Classical Decision Making (CDM), recently, had been dismissed in favour of 
NDM (Lyle, 2010) when it came to describing and understanding coach decision 
making. However, CDM is relevant to coaching practice as it matches up with 
coaching practice specifically “during planning, implementation and review stages of 
practice” (Abraham & Collins, 2011, p. 374). Abraham and Collins (2011) argue that, 
NDM cannot be the sole focus of coaches decision making; “... a sole focus on NDM 
completely obviates the complexity inherent in the coaching environment” (p. 374). 
The importance of CDM is strengthened through Abraham and Collins (2011) 
‘Nested Model’, where NDM and CDM are intricately linked, to the point where NDM 
needs CDM to flourish. Consistent with cognitive psychology theory, NDM flourishes 
through strong mental models and for these to be strengthened a high level of 
cognitive engagement, thought and critical analysis is needed. In relation to the 
nested model, strengthening of mental models occurs within the Macro and Meso 
levels which are predominately a CDM process focusing on long term and medium 
term goals, planning and agendas.  
In somewhat of a chain reaction, each level of the nested model is linked to 
the other through nesting. Abraham and Collins (2011) explain that when the 
decisions are taken at the coalface (NDM) they are then “embedded (nested) within 
medium term agendas which themselves are linked to (nested within) longer term 
aims” (p. 380). Longer-term aims (Macro level) are predominately a CDM process 
focusing on long term sociopolitical goals that for the performance coach are about 
“managing upwards on performance expectations” (p. 380). Within the Macro level 
there is some element of NDM occurring, which according to Abraham and Collins 
(2011) is “inevitable in any form of planning process” (p. 380), meaning intervention 
can occur at any time.  
Medium term agendas (Meso level) are, predominantly a CDM process 
concerned with “goal setting and planning for the socio-motivational and tactical 
environment” (p. 380). Goal setting and planning are required for the macro goals to 
be achieved. On a socio-motivational level the aim is to develop self-determination 
and ownership for the athlete and represents a good opportunity to create the right 
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environment to get assistant coach buy in. Tactically, planning is about approaches 
to game play and hitting important performance and development markers (that act 
as evidence of progress). NDM is relevant in the Meso level and occurs within the 
tweaking of goals as progress is reviewed. 
The taking of decisions is called the Micro level and is an NDM process, 
which is concerned with planning and delivery. This level is where the coach needs 
to respond to situations as they arise. However, Abraham and Collins (2011) explain 
that due to “taking a nested approach and premortem-ing possible challenges, the 
coach is better prepared to both make naturalistic decisions and more able to 
recognise when a decision is heuristic based or biased and needs externally 
referenced critique” (p. 381). This nested approach is the link between CDM and 
NDM and explains why CDM is important to improving decisions under pressure.  
If we take Abraham and Collins (2011) nested model as appropriate, then 
NDM is still the best way to describe coaches decision making under pressure, 
however CDM is needed to be able to improve coaches decisions under pressure. 
With understanding the current coach decision-making landscape it can be argued 
that this current study is best described in the NDM paradigm and can fit into the 
nested model within the Micro level.  
Taking into account the research, arguments and opinions mentioned above, 
decision-making is important to study within the domain of coaching due to decision 
making playing an important part in coaching practice. More specifically, the NDM 
paradigm is appropriate to understand how head coaches make decisions in the box 
on match day and the basic concepts (from NDM) are suitable for analysing and 
understanding coach cognitions.  
Cognitive Psychology 
In this section, I will explain cognitive psychology theory, its history, including 
mental models and the role these play with coaches’ practice. The cognitive 
mechanism of a coach will be explored throughout practice including understanding 
coaches’ knowledge structures. In particular, understanding how knowledge is 
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organised and how a coach deals with new information throughout practice will be 
discussed.  
Cognitive psychology is the study of how humans think (Regeher & Norman, 
1996). Specifically, cognitive psychology aims to understand “human mental 
processes” (p. 4) and the role these processes play in “thinking, feeling and 
behaving” (Kellogg, 2007, p. 4). Cognitive psychology emerged from behaviourism, 
and respectfully George A. Miller considered the brain as analogous to a computer 
(Crowther-Heyck, 1999). However, this computer metaphor did not capture the 
complexities of the brain because it was not as simple as having each individual bit 
of information travelling through separate stages of memory. Specific properties of 
information were components in all stages of memory (i.e. perceptual, short and long 
term) and were distinguished by the developed notion of working and active memory, 
which characteristically are the processes in the act of thinking (Regeher & Norman, 
1996). Therefore, human information processing assumes that the brain has the 
“ability to perceive, comprehend, learn, decide and act,” and these abilities are 
dependent on mental representations (Kellogg, 2007, p. 7). These mental 
representations are concerned with how information is stored and used in the mind 
(Kosslyn, 1984). Johnson-Laird (1983) takes it a step further by saying that if you 
have an understanding of a certain domain then you have a ‘mental representation 
that serves as a model of an entity’, which is classified as a mental model. For 
example, within Australian Rules football, the head coach may have a mental 
representation of a player (let’s call him ‘Bob’) within his team who is physically tall 
and big, he has strong hands to be able to mark (AFL term for catch the football on 
the full whereby the player is awarded an uncontested kick). Bob is a player who is 
technically very good at kicking for goal. With this representation, the coach goes 
into the game with a model to play him 1:1 in the forward line to dominate his 
opponent. This next section focuses on understanding mental models, specifically 
how the coach cognitively manages information and structures knowledge within a 
naturalistic setting and the role this cognitive management plays in decision making 
throughout coaching practice. 
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Mental models. Constructed through a process called schemata (Lipshitz & 
Shaul, 2009), mental models are best described as a cluster of knowledge or 
knowledge structures that are based on past experiences and represent specific 
situations or events (Brewer & Treyens, 1981).  Another interpretive description 
describes schemata as “frameworks through which we represent the world to 
ourselves” (Lyle, 2010, p. 32). In other words, we build a perception of a specific 
situation (meaning) through our experiences and our ability to visually “identify 
incoming information, referred to as the stimulus” (Schmidt & Wrisberg, 2000, p. 28). 
The new information or “visual stimuli” (Schmidt 1975), interacts with the old and 
current perceptions of the situation, by providing expectations for and constraints on 
the set of related properties associated with that concept (Brewer & Treyens, 1981; 
Thorndike, 1984; Schmidt, 1975). It is this process, which re-shapes the schemata, 
for example, to continue our story with Bob; the coach plays Bob in the forward line 
1:1 with his opponent. The coach makes this decision because he perceives Bob as 
physically superior due to his height. The coach too has previously seen Bob take 
good overhead marks in 1-on-1 situations, in training sessions and matches. 
However, it starts to rain and the coach visually observes Bob isn’t very good at 
marking a wet ball overhead in the rain. Over a period of a few minutes the coach 
has seen Bob drop three overhead marks. Therefore, the coach now has to combine 
this new information (i.e., stimulus) with the old and his perception of what Bob is 
capable of and change his expectations of Bob’s performance in the rain. 
Functionally, schemata can organise various types of knowledge, which ‘supports’ 
and ‘streamlines’ cognitive processing by providing a) structures for acquiring new 
knowledge, b) representations for problem solving strategies, and c) multi-
dimensional data structures that support situation assessment (Thorndike, 1984). 
These functions are consistent with Lipshitz and Shaul’s (2009) more contemporary 
account of schemata in that people organise and construct the knowledge into 
mental models that psychologically represent a specified environment and the 
behaviour, which is expected (Holyoak, 1984). Continuing our story, the coach has a 
new mental model regarding Bob’s performance in the rain that changes the coach’s 
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expectations of Bob within this situation. This decision-making behavior within the 
NDM paradigm is predicated on accessing organised knowledge (Lyle, 2010), 
especially within coaching practice such as matches and training sessions.  
Coach cognitions. Within coaching literature, it is suggested that if the coach 
who is constructing a mental model has a wealth of knowledge, then the 
representation will be more accurate (Côté, Salmela, Trudel, Baria, & Russell, 1995). 
For example, if the coach knew Bob was not good in the rain he would have had a 
stronger and more accurate representation of Bob’s capabilities. When it comes time 
to make a decision under pressure the coach manages mental models by organising 
them hierarchically (Abraham, Collins, & Martindale, 2006; Debanne & Fontayne, 
2009). The coach takes action according to priorities and moves to the next level of 
the hierarchy once lower level problems are resolved (Debanne & Fontayne, 2009). 
This process enables the coach to rapidly assess each specific situation. While 
assessing the situation quickly, if the assessment does not fit the coach’s mental 
model, a change can be made allowing the next mental model in the line to be 
accessed (Côté et al., 1995). Returning to Bob, because it started raining and he 
was not good at marking the ball in the rain, the situation did not fit the expected 
model; therefore, the coach accesses the next mental model, which is based on his 
previous experiences. The next model in the line could be to put a smaller, fast 
player in the forward line with Bob to pick up the ball from any marks that Bob drops.  
Evidence of this hierarchical organisation for coaches’ cognitive management 
has been illustrated through the empirical work of Debanne and Fontaynne (2009) 
who describe the types of task the coach faces through a competitive match. Other 
in-game research on coaches has focused on behavior (e.g., Smith & Cushion, 
2006) and interactive decision making (e.g., Gilbert et al., 1999). 
Lyle (2010) describes a type of knowledge structure specific to Naturalistic 
Decision Making (NDM) known as ‘scripts’, which are shaped into mental models. 
Scripts can be deemed as “images or models of the situation, it’s determinants and 
likely future outcomes” (p. 32) and they play the role of predicting “sequences of 
events, including like solutions to a problem” (p. 32) to recognize or understand what 
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is happening. He explains that via scripts experts are able to recognise cases that 
are similar to previous examples and apply indifferent methodology for solutions. 
Returning to the vignette the coach has decided to put a smaller player into the 
forward line, because his perception might be that this type of player will be able to 
retrieve any ball Bob drops. However, the coach is scanning all the small players 
trying to find the right player for the job. When he sees Fred, the coach remembers 
Fred has done this role twice before, both times in the rain. Bob makes the decision 
to send Fred in the forward line to help Bob. The cognitive mechanism of an expert 
coach throughout coaching practice, including matches and training sessions, is a 
slow interactive script (Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010). Throughout a match where 
serial or unfolding situations occur, Harvey et al. (2015) and Lyle (2010) describe the 
coach as someone who continually refines mental models through a slow interactive 
script, trying to control or maintain what was initially planned, what has emerged 
throughout the duration of the match, and how the situation matches up to previous 
experiences. For example, the coach wanted to use Bob’s physical and technical 
capabilities, however what was initially planned was not working. The coach framed 
the problem through performance of the player within the wet conditions. Therefore, 
the coach had to find an alternative, which allowed him to control or maintain the 
match close to what was initially planned. The nature of the script “evolves through a 
process of pattern recognition and/or problem framing (Harvey et al., 2015, p. 166). 
Recognising patterns is the ability to identify incoming information, (which as 
mentioned previously is known as stimulus; Schmidt & Wrisberg, 2000). The pattern 
recognition in relation to Bob was highlighted previously, where the coach through 
visual stimuli identified a pattern of Bob dropping overhead marks. Recognising this 
pattern informed the coach the initial plan was not working and contributed the 
process of problem framing.  
Problem framing is a way for the coach to make sense of a situational 
problem by understanding the reasons and/or circumstances of how the situation 
arose (Lyle, 2010). One way the coach can deal with these serial or unfolding 
situations (to understand what is happening throughout a match) is to use part of 
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their expertise to build up a scenario. This tacit process of scenario building is a form 
of schemata in which the coach builds stories as a mechanism to deal with serial or 
unfolding situations that are occurring. Once the coach has an understanding of the 
situation and a mental model formed, the next step is for the coach to make a 
decision.  
Matchday Coaching Conclusions.  
The aim of this section is to revisit and summarise bringing to conclusion what 
is known about match day coaching. This includes a) decision making (Gilbert et al., 
1999; Harvey et al., 2015) and the attempt to describe and understand what triggers 
a decision; b) cognitive management (Debanne & Fontayne, 2009), understanding 
the cognitive mechanism of a coach throughout a game; and c) coach behaviours 
and communication (Smith & Cushion, 2006; Trudel et al., 1999), where 
recommendations are provided to improve coach effectiveness. In relation to AFL 
coaching in the box on match day we know it is the biggest concern and 
“undoubtedly, the most challenging task for coaches” (Mallett et al., 2007, p. 6). 
On match day, coaches can use the deliberate strategy of being silent to 
monitor the game and reflect on appropriate interventions (Smith & Cushion, 2006). 
This behaviour of being silent and observing the game in detail allows a combination 
of sub conscious and conscious information processing and allows the coach to 
conduct insightful analysis, which is vital for coaching success (Smith & Cushion, 
2006). Knowing when to intervene with a decision is based on certain events 
coaches may focus on within a match. As mentioned earlier, these events are known 
as ‘key attractors’ which act as a catalyst and could potentially trigger the coach to 
make a decision once the coaches ‘threshold’ is breached (Harvey et al., 2015). 
Some of these key attractors and catalysts can be factors based around contextual 
cues (field information) and performance (Gilbert et al., 1999), relating to the context 
of the match. Specifically, some of the key attractors and catalysts Harvey et al., 
(2015) identified were, the teams or coaches goals being threatened, weaknesses 
identified, and the game plan not working. We also know throughout a match, 
coaches consider player knowledge (player characteristics), habits, and history 
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(Gilbert et al., 1999), when making decisions, which could delay the threshold being 
breached when actually making a decision.  
Intervention from the coach does not necessarily need to be a decision, it can 
take the form of communication, instructing, and providing feedback. Smith and 
Cushion (2006) provide suggestions for effective communication on match day, 
including all interactions should be personalised and feedback should be measured, 
specifically regarding amount, content, timing, and specified with the information 
given. The advice is short selective comments from the coach to ovoid cognitive 
overload. Regarding youth coaches, Smith and Cushion (2006) encourage insightful 
correctional instruction following mistakes, combined with support and 
encouragement. Advising to reduce the amount of negative feedback given to youth 
players and be specific with praise regarding performance, outcome, effort, 
improvement and skill execution.  
In relation to the cognitive mechanism of the coach, Harvey et al., (2015) 
advises that coaches’ decision making is intuitive, tacit, and semi-deliberative in 
nature. Throughout practice, coaches use a slow interactive script that evolves with 
pattern recognition and/or problem framing (Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010). Other 
key concepts the coach might use throughout practice are mental simulations, 
situational analysis, and emergent decisions. In relation to cognitive organisation, 
Debanne and Fontayne (2009) explain coaches prioritise tasks (e.g., technical and 
tactical instructions) in a hierarchical order. Once lower levels are resolved the coach 
will likely move to the next level of the hierarchy or priority.  
In light of the information above, there has been very little research conducted 
within the NDM paradigm to describe and understand how expert coaches take 
decisions in a live match situation. Harvey et al., (2015) describe the triggers to a 
decision, which help us understand what makes the coach take the decision, and 
Gilbert et al. (1999) tells us what the coach considers throughout a game, which 
could potentially affect decisions the coach makes. These two papers, more so 
Harvey et al., (2015), are directly related to the aims of this paper, in describing and 
understanding coaches’ decision making on matchday. However, not only does this 
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need to be explored in more depth, to either back up and expand on what has been 
discovered, but also to challenge the current findings to understanding coach 
decision making throughout a match. In regards to coaching on matchday as an AFL 
coach the only solid evidence we have is coaching in the coaches box is of concern 
and a challenging task (Mallett et al., 2007). In this paper, I aim to alleviate these 
concerns and the overwhelming tasks by informing coach education and 
professional development opportunities for improving the decision making 
capabilities of Australian Football League coaches on match day. Specifically, 
understanding the situational assessment processes, including what components 
inform assessments and will assist the coach in understanding what forms an 
assessment. Recognising situations quickly and therefore making more effective or 
better decisions can enable a coach to reduce and cope with the uncertainty of each 
decision. 
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Chapter 3: Method 
Methods describe and explain the purpose and aims of the research and how 
the process was conducted; including details about the participants and what ethical 
concerns needed to be addressed before the research commenced. Additionally, I 
have explained the procedures used, such as stimulated recall, and semi-structured 
interviews, and the data analytic processes used to make sense of the data.  
Data were collected to examine a head coach coaching in the coaches’ box 
on match day. The aim of the data collection was to describe and understand how a 
head coach takes decisions throughout the match. Prior to this, the aim was to 
establish whether or not head coach decisions were perceived to have an influence 
on the match. The purpose of establishing this perception was due to the centrality of 
decision making; if decision making did not influence, then there was little point to 
describe and understand decisions at all.  
Examining the head coach on match day to describe and understand how 
decisions were taken was achieved by conducting stimulated recall interviews. 
Establishing the perception of whether or not decisions influenced a match was 
achieved by conducting semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted first and were used to establish the perceptions of influence decisions had 
on the game. Interviews with the players and runners were conducted in focus 
groups to maximise involvement and allow participants to generate conversation 
amongst each other and build upon the responses of others. Stimulated recall 
interviews commenced at the completion of the semi-structured interviews. There 
were three games in which the researcher sat inside the coaches’ box and 
conducted three separate stimulated recall interviews with the head coach two days 
after each game.  
Participants 
The participants were one male head coach aged 40, nine male players aged 
18-30 and two male runners aged 30-45, all whom were a part of the same team. 
The researcher had a pre-existing professional relationship with the coach, having 
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worked together in coach development capacities over a number of years. The 
coaching history of the participating coach spanned over 16 years, including 
coaching three football clubs and being Director of Sport at a high school for four 
years. He has spent 11 years coaching either semi-professionally or professionally 
as a head coach and at the time of the study was employed as a coach at a club in 
the Australian Football League (AFL) where one of his roles at the time of data 
collection was to be head coach of the development team. The participating head 
coach has previously won premierships as a head coach at TAC Cup (Under 18 
representative competition for Australian Rules football) level, Victorian Football 
League (VFL) level, and as a part of a coaching team at Australian Football League 
(AFL) level. 
The researcher received the participation of current or previous AFL listed 
players (those on official rosters), who at some stage, played under the head coach. 
These players were interviewed because they could potentially provide deeper 
insights and add more depth to the data. Players added value through their playing 
experiences, their own perception of pressure at the highest level and familiarity with 
the decision making behaviour of the participating head coach, which assisted in 
recognising decisions made. There were nine players, who were split into three 
focus groups of two, two and five players. Each focus group was organised 
according to player availability. The head coach facilitated access to these 
participants. All but two of the players were AFL listed professional footballers, 
meaning all but two players were on a contract with an AFL club and were eligible to 
play AFL games at the time of the research. The other two players had previously 
been on AFL lists, with one player having played 119 and the other 33 AFL games.  
There were two runners who came together to form a focus group. Their 
employment positions can be classified as casual/part time roles, in which they were 
predominately required on match day and for training sessions. Operationally, the 
head coach used both runners together throughout a match. The runners would 
receive instruction from the coach via a phone, which was connected to the coaches 
box and would proceed to deliver the message to the player/s. The runners were a 
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team, who had to communicate with each other to make sure all the messages were 
delivered correctly.  
Ethics 
A university ethics committee gave ethical clearance for this research project. 
Information sheets and consent forms were approved for use with the Head Coach, 
Players, and Runners. All of the information sheets and consent forms were read 
and signed by the participants. Please see Appendix B: Ethical Clearance Letter for 
further information. 
The key ethical dimensions to this project related to the difficulty of anonymity 
regarding the Head Coach. With few total participants involved in the study and only 
one coach, there were identified issues related to the distribution of results and 
submission for publication. Therefore, in order to achieve ethical approval, finding in 
this thesis are to be presented based on consensual agreement and through the use 
of overall themes used. In addition, all identifiers are removed. For the purposes of 
maintaining anonymity, pseudonyms are also used. The coach will have the 
pseudonym of ‘Geoff’, while any player or runner will be referred to as ‘player/s’ and 
‘runner/s’. 
Procedures 
 There were two phases to the data collection, semi-structured interviews and 
stimulated recall. Semi-structured interviews involved the head coach, players and 
runners, with the aim of establishing whether or not coaches’ decisions influence the 
match. Stimulated recall interviews were conducted solely with the head coach over 
three games to describe and understand how a head coach makes decisions in the 
coaches’ box on match day.  
Semi-structured interviews. The total duration of interviews was 178 
minutes and resulted in 79 pages of transcriptions. In total, there were five semi-
structured interviews conducted. This included three player focus groups, one runner 
focus group and a head coach interview. Each focus group had their own time 
restrictions (meaning participants were only available for a certain period of time), 
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and this ranged from 15 minutes to 45 minutes, with the head coach’s having a time 
restriction of 1 hour and 15 minutes.  The semi-structured interviews were either 
video or audio recorded and conducted using the critical decision method, due to its 
favouritism within the NDM paradigm (Lyle & Vergeer, 2013).  
The critical decision method is appropriate because it shares similar 
characteristics with naturalistic settings, time-pressured environments, non-routine 
decision making and situational assessment. It allows the use of “cognitive probes to 
determine the bases for situational assessment and decision making during non-
routine decisions” (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989, p. 462). This method 
provides flexibility in studying the cognitive bases of decision making in naturalistic 
settings with people at different levels (Klein et al., 1989). Therefore, suiting the 
participants of the semi-structured interviews who ranged from experienced AFL 
players to players yet to get their first AFL game, to runners, and the Head Coach. 
The critical decision method for eliciting knowledge adapted from Klein et al. (1989) 
and used by the researcher throughout the duration of the semi-structured interviews 
was as follows: (1) The players and runners had to select an incident (a non-routine 
incident – critical decision); (2) give an unstructured incident account from start to 
finish; and (3) whilst this was occurring the researcher constructed an incident 
timeline; and (4) located within the timeline a decision point; once it was located the 
(5) decision point was probed. 
 There were two objectives regarding the head coach when conducting the 
semi-structured interviews; First, was to establish whether or not he perceived his 
own decisions to influence the game and; second, to describe and understand how 
he makes decisions in the coaches box on match day. Some examples of the 
questions asked throughout the semi-structured interviews were: “The information 
you needed to make that decision, where did you draw that from?” and “How 
important was that decision?” and “Did that decision affect the result of the match?” 
and “Did that decision influence the game?”  
The objective of the semi-structured interviews of the players and runners was 
to establish whether or not the decisions made by the head coach influenced the 
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game. For the runners and the players, the critical decision method was used to pin-
point a critical decision they received from the head coach and understand how they 
interpreted and viewed the decision. For example, some of the questions asked to 
the players were; “With the instructions that come down from the box on match day, 
in what way do you think it influences the way you play?” and “What were your initial 
thoughts when you heard the message?” and “What did you do when you heard the 
instruction?” Likewise questions asked to the runners were: “With the instructions 
that come down from the box on match day, in what way do you think it influences 
the way the team or the players play?”; “And then when you were told the 
instructions, what was the players response?” and “Do you think that that instruction 
or that instruction influenced the game at all?” 
Stimulated recall. There were three Stimulated Recall (SR) interviews 
conducted with a total duration of 156 minutes, resulting in 55 pages of 
transcriptions. The SR procedure (Lyle, 2003) followed strict guidelines to direct the 
identification of the critical decisions and to ensure the SR interviews were 
conducted efficiently and effectively. There were three SR interviews conducted 
throughout the home and away season. All three recorded games were played on a 
Saturday at the club’s home ground. Each entire game (a minimum of 100 minutes, 
not including extra time) was recorded in the coaches’ box via a GoPro [Hero3, 
Silver Series] camera, recording a front facing shot of the coach within the box. The 
GoPro camera was attached to the window of the coaches’ box by a suction cup. 
This process of using video footage is a “vehicle for accessing cognitive processes” 
(Lyle, 2003, p. 875) and the GoPro was the most appropriate device to use, due to 
its small size and its ability to be attached to the glass window of the coaches’ box 
facing the coach. The GoPro’s inconspicuous size and location meant that it did not 
interfere with the head coach and his staff throughout the match. Throughout the 
game the researcher was able to see what the GoPro camera was recording through 
the GoPro application on the mobile phone as well as hear the quality of audio being 
recorded through headphones connected to the mobile phone. The GoPro was able 
to provide an ultra wide field of view, allowing the researcher to see the head coach 
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and a select number of assistant coaches and support staff within the box. The audio 
was on a 5 second delay to help conduct the ongoing timeline. This delay aided the 
creation of the timeline in that if a decision was missed, the researcher could re-hear 
it on the delay. Post game, official match footage was obtained from the club who 
had been recording it for analytical purposes (at this level of competition, every 
match is recorded in an official capacity).  
As mentioned earlier, while observing the game, a dot point timeline was 
conducted by the researcher. This timeline recorded every interaction the head 
coach had with other coaches in the box or communications with players, staff or 
coaches using the phone (there is a phone relay from the coaches’ box down to the 
bench). As this occurred, the researcher made a side note of any decisions that he 
determined to be a critical decision. Critical decisions were defined as decisions 
made to try and influence the game, because control of the game was perceived to 
be declining, lost, or potentially lost in reaction to the opposition, the own team’s 
ineffectiveness or the ineffectiveness of an individual player within the coach’s team. 
A decision was judged critical, if an individual player was moved into another position 
and the player’s role had changed, the structure of the team was changed or a 
decision was made to try and control the tempo of the game, such as in relation to 
ball movement. At the end of each quarter the researcher went back through the 
timeline and reviewed the points to determine if there were any critical decisions that 
were missed and to review the ones that were highlighted to make sure they were 
critical decisions. 
The following morning (Sunday) the researcher spoke with the head coach on 
the phone to see if the coach could remember any critical decisions he thought he 
had made throughout the game. The critical decisions the head coach mentioned 
were matched up with critical decisions the researcher had noted down. On the odd 
occasion a critical decision in which the head coach mentioned did not match with 
the critical decisions noted down by the researcher, the researcher would ascertain 
when this occurred and locate the decisions on the dot point timeline and seek to 
locate the incident on the recorded footage. This process was important due to the 
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minimal time the researcher had with the head coach on the day of recall and 
showed care to reduce memory decay (Lyle, 2003). Once all of the technical logistics 
(mentioned below) were accounted for, the critical decisions were located on the split 
screen (see Appendix C for a visual on the split screen used for stimulated recall) 
movie file in preparation for the SR procedure on the Monday. The questions and 
probes to the head coach were typed up on a running sheet as well as a time list of 
the critical decisions in preparation for the interview. When asking the questions, the 
process used was similar to the one advocated by Lyle (2003), whereby the coach 
was asked to review the situation and decision made on the split screen footage. If 
the head coach recalled the situation, he was asked to describe the decision, why it 
was made, and to “elaborate on any element of the decision” (Lyle, 2003, p. 870). 
Before the start of each of the SR sessions, the coach was asked to be honest and if 
he did not remember the situation not make up what he might have thought or what 
he thinks now while watching the footage. To make sure this was the case, if there 
was any doubt the researcher asked the question “is that what you thought at the 
time or is that what you are thinking now?”  
It is important to note that the time from when the game finished (Saturday 
afternoon) to the stimulated recall interview (Monday morning), time was spent 
uploading the files (head coach footage and game footage) into a movie editing 
software package (iMovie), syncing theses files into a split screen movie, and 
exporting the footage as a movie file in preparation for the stimulated recall interview. 
The stimulated recall interviews occurred on the Monday mornings, two days after 
the game.  
Data Analysis  
This section describes and explains the overall data analytic procedures used 
in this study. These procedures included the use of a deductive-inductive analysis 
and the use of a hierarchical content analysis that involved a long, back and forth 
process. The use of triangular consensus was used to promote trustworthiness of 
the analysis. Probing and in-depth interviews were conducted and all interviews 
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transcribed verbatim with a total of 134 pages collated. Data analysis began with all 
transcriptions uploaded into NVIVO (v.10) and included thorough reading of the 
transcriptions (consistent with inductive analysis procedures; Tesch, 1990), with the 
researcher reading all transcriptions a minimum of three times. Throughout the 
analysis, process specific observations were made relating to the decisions the head 
coach made under pressure on match day and building toward general patterns that 
may occur when trying to describe and understand the decisions made. This 
direction makes the analysis process partially inductive because the study had 
already established what the important dimensions would be (decision making). To 
understand the direction of partial analysis taken by the researcher a more in depth 
explanation of inductive analysis is required. 
Inductive analysis allows the true dimensions of the research to emerge from 
patterns found in the cases under study. This occurs by taking away the assumption 
of what the important dimensions of the analysis will be (Patton, 1990), which 
Thomas (2006) supports by mentioning that the “findings arise directly from the 
analysis of the raw data, not from a priori expectations or models” (p. 239). However, 
going into the analysis, the aim of the researcher was to answer specific research 
questions regarding coach decisions. This was to be achieved by evaluating decision 
making under pressure in the coaches’ box on match day which gives us a focus of 
relevance when conducting the analysis, not however a set of expectations about 
specific findings (Thomas, 2006). However, consistent with inductive analysis “the 
units of analysis or data segments were not predetermined but were carved out from 
the data according to their meaning” (Tesch, 1990, p. 90). The other common 
characteristic applied from inductive analysis theory was a hierarchical content 
analysis, which is explained next. 
While analysing the data, transcriptions were read and divided into segments 
with meaning (Meaningful Units (MU)) to create tags. Tesch (1990) defines a 
segment of text as “comprehensible by itself and contains one idea, episode, or 
piece of information” (p. 116). Once all the segments were categorised, the aim was 
to establish common features of the categorised text segments and find a 
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relationship between them (Côté, Salmela, Baria, & Russell, 1993). This process of 
finding a relationship between the tags was continued throughout all the data; as 
tags are matched, they are given a category. If the tags do not match up to 
previously formed categories, a new category is created. Once there is depth to the 
categories, each category was linked to other categories and a hierarchy was 
established (Thomas, 2006). All MU, were coded and those tags and categories not 
related to decisions were placed in a separate folder within NVIVO called ‘Non 
Decision Related Nodes’.  
Analysis was a long, back and forth process, involving constant reviewing of 
the quality of segments within the tags. This occurred pre-triangular consensus 
where the researcher was wrestling with the data. During and post the triangular 
consensus process, the researcher was challenged to look at the analysis from a 
different perspective. Specifically, the triangular consensus process challenged the 
researcher to treat the subjects (players, runners and head coach) individually as 
opposed to as one collective unit. This perspective of analysis and the results this 
produced not only challenged the researcher but had a domino effect. This meant 
the researcher would go back into the transcriptions from where the MU came from 
to check the context and validity of the MU and at times change and edit the 
segments and review titles of the tags and categories. This analytical behaviour is 
considered to be normal and part of the process as Côté et al. (1993) explain the 
“tag can be changed in the analysis process” (p. 131) and the category “can be 
modified and refined until a satisfactory system is established” (p. 132).  
Trustworthiness. According to Barzansky, Berner and Beckman (1983) 
credibility, transferability, dependability, confirmability are the four characteristics that 
“must be satisfied for a naturalistic inquiry to be considered trustworthy” (p. 194). 
Credibility was achieved through member checks of the head coach transcriptions 
(semi-structured and stimulated recall interviews). Throughout the member check 
process, the only head coach correction related to a clarification of the years of 
coaching experience that he had previously mentioned within the interview. This 
adjustment was made to the transcriptions and was the only change made.  
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Confirmability was achieved via triangular consensus, which occurred 
throughout the data analysis process. Triangular consensus was used so the 
researcher could regard their material critically and to test whether to take the 
analysis in a different approach or direction (Fielding & Fielding, 1986). This was 
achieved through discussions with research supervisors, where the researcher 
presented raw findings in the form of a schematic. Using the schematic as basis, the 
researcher was questioned and had to justify the reasoning behind why the research 
was heading in the direction it was, including why categories were titled as they 
were. Research supervisors suggested changes regarding the titles of categories, to 
better understand what the group of meaning units represented and made 
suggestions for the reconstruction of categories. Post triangular consensus, an 
exhaustive back and forth process was conducted where the researcher had to delve 
deeper into the raw data and was challenged by research supervisors to think 
critically about the analysis process. 
Dependability was achieved via an audit trail reviewing timelines throughout 
data collection, confirming critical decisions made post data collection and pre 
interview, and by having all interviews recorded, provided a database to perform an 
audit if necessary. Transferability was achieved via a “thick description” (Barzansky, 
Berner, & Beckman, 1983, p. 204) of thorough timelines throughout data collection 
on every comment made throughout each quarter of each of the games.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
In this section, results are presented from a thorough and exhaustive 
analytical process producing 668 Meaning Units (MU), comprising three higher order 
themes; Situational Assessment, Certainty v Uncertainty and Decisions Made. These 
higher order themes were followed by nine categories and 16 sub categories. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the higher order theme of Certainty v Uncertainty is linked to 
the first research question concerning whether or not coach decisions are perceived 
to influence the game. The other two higher order themes, Situational Assessment 
and Decisions Made, are linked with the second research question, describing and 
understanding decision-making under pressure. 
The results are broken up into two sections reporting the findings in relation to 
the key research questions. The first section is focused on the perceptions of a 
coach’s influence, from the runners’ and players’ perspectives, followed by how the 
head coach perceives the influence of his own decisions. The first section concludes 
with a consideration of the uncertainty of a decision and its influence, including when 
it occurs and how the coach manages it. The second section is focused on 
describing and understanding coaches’ decision making by reporting the findings of 
a two part assessment process, based around a situational problem: (i) Situational 
Story, which is about the coach understanding the problem; and (ii) Player 
Knowledge, which is about the depth of knowledge the coach has of his players’ 
qualities.  
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Figure 1.Overview of results showing the higher order themes, categories, and the 
aggregated tags.  
Perceptions of a Coach’s Influence 
The perception of whether or not coach decisions influence the game was 
examined and the analysis conducted resulted in the creation of the higher order 
theme Certainty v Uncertainty (as seen in Figure 1). This theme had an aggregated 
176 references, three categories and five sub categories. The theme Certainty v 
Uncertainty means there was no one straight forward answer to the question of, ‘are 
coaches’ decisions perceived to influence the game?’ This is highlighted in the three 
categories underpinning the higher order theme. They were Compliance v Non-
Compliance, Decisions Influencing the Game, and Uncertainty. The category of 
Compliance versus Non Compliance was concerned with players complying with the 
coach or choosing to ignore the coach and conduct their own action. In other words, 
if the players do not comply with the coach’s decision there will be minimal influence 
on the game. The category of Decisions Influencing the Game consisted of 69 
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references and represented examples of decisions influencing the game. Decisions 
Influencing the Game represents the Certainty components of the higher order them 
Certainty v Uncertainty. The category titled Uncertainty represents the uncertainty 
component of the higher order theme of Certainty v Uncertainty. Indeed, there was 
uncertainty relating to whether or not the coach’s decision influenced the game. The 
category of Uncertainty included four sub categories: Decision did not Influence the 
Game, Uncertainty Pre Decision, Uncertainty of a Decision’s Influence, Uncertainty if 
the Decision was not Made.  
The perception of how frequent decisions were and the level of impact a 
decision’s influence had on the game differed depending on the participant (i.e. 
coach, runner or player). The coach was reserved on the level of influence a 
decision had due to a number of uncertainties associated with making the decisions, 
whereas runners and players perceived the coach’s decisions to impact the game. 
Due to the varying perceptions of whether or not coaches’ decisions influence the 
game, this next section will look at what component of the game the players and 
runners perceived decisions to have influenced. Followed by the head coach’s 
perceptions of his own decisions, understanding the uncertainty the head coach has 
on the decisions influence. 
Runner and player perceptions. The runners’ and players’ understandings 
of how coach’s decisions influence the game differed, due to the different roles they 
each play on match day. However, generally speaking runners and players believed 
a coach’s decisions can; 1. Influence the game flow by controlling ball movement; 
and 2. Help the team to get back on track by changing the structure of the team. The 
runners recalled an instruction they passed onto a player to try and get the ball 
moving forward. This example highlights the runner’s understanding of a decision 
and how it can influence the game: 
…but that did come out from the coach that he [player] needed to push forward and to kick 
the ball or punch the ball back towards our goals prior to the actual incident happening. We 
verbalized that to the player, the player actually did that and it resulted in a positive towards 
our team, that we could influence the game… (Runner) 
45 
 
 
 45 
Similarly, the players perceived that system (based) decisions influenced 
game flow through ball movement to control the game. In the example below, the 
players provide an example of where a decision was taken to slow the play down 
and control the tempo via the use of a key word, which was delivered to all players, 
the key word is ‘SZ’. All players had a clear understanding of what ‘SZ’ meant and 
therefore were all ‘on the same page’. The players collectively trusted that the 
systematic decision would help them win the game: 
One player explained: 
Just control the game. We were up and just needed to control the game, run the clock down 
and keep it in our favour; just hold onto the ball, just manage the time and make sure we have 
possession [player describing the SZ decision] 
Player’s perceptions of a decision’s influence were specific in terms of their 
own understanding of the game. The players believed structural decisions had an 
influence on the game, especially if the game wasn’t going to expectation. In 
particular, defensive structural decisions achieved the outcome of realigning and 
getting the team back on track. One player explained: 
I think it definitely does make a massive difference in getting the message to – to get yourself, 
and also the team, back on the right track, so that you – you know, you might be three goals 
down, so then you don’t turn that around and be 10 goals down within another 5 minutes.  
The results and examples provided offer insights into how runners and 
players perceive a coach’s decisions influence the game and in what context this 
occurs. The next section focuses on Geoff’s own perceptions of decisions influence 
throughout a game and the uncertainties faced. 
Coach perceptions. Geoff perceived his decisions influenced the game when 
he felt the decision he made led to his team retaining or regaining control of the 
situation and/or the game. Controlling the situation can be related to countering the 
opposition (as a whole or an individual player) or solving the poor performance of his 
own team and players. In the example below, Geoff recognised his team structure 
was ineffective and it was not controlling the flow of the game. Geoff framed a 
problem within his own forward line, identifying that he had too many tall players. 
Through his knowledge of the tall players within his team, he was able to make a 
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decision related to one player, to impact the team as a whole and influence the 
game, so that the flow of the game was regained. Geoff explained that after he made 
the decision to remove one of the taller players: “I was really happy with the benefit 
of starting to get the clearances back in our favour, generating more ball through into 
– into our forward 50”(Geoff). He continued to explain that although they did not win 
the game, the decision helped his team to regain control, therefore still influencing 
the game: “Well, we – we didn’t win the game and – but the fact that we got it back 
on our terms,” (Geoff).  
 The above example highlights the point that although decisions may influence 
the game, it does not mean the outcome will guarantee a win. However, in certain 
instances, if the decision was not made, there would be a lesser chance of winning 
(larger margin of loss, smaller margin of win). Geoff explains: “So I – I can’t say it 
definitely won us the game, but I think that – I think we would have been under more 
pressure if we hadn’t of done that decision and…”(Geoff). 
In the following situational story, the scores were close and Geoff’s team was 
holding onto a slender lead with only a few minutes left. The opposition had 
momentum and Geoff’s team was tired. With little time to regain full control of the 
game, the team and the coach were trying to just hold on and hope to remain in front 
until the final siren rung. In this highly intense situation, Geoff perceived his decision 
influenced the situation, and as a result his team was able to hold on and win the 
game. Geoff made the decision to put a spare (meaning to out number the 
opposition players, so the head coach always had a spare player) player in the back 
line, and it was this same player who took the match-winning mark, moments before 
the siren went. Reflecting on the decision, Geoff believed the decision influenced the 
match: “But – but I think it did influence – it definitely influenced the last five minutes 
of the game when we only had a narrow margin to hang on to win; it definitely 
influenced that period, yeah.” However there is reservation in concluding the 
decision won them the game, Geoff explains in more detail: 
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And – and I think – I think it was a critical decision to get seven back, you know, do I think that 
it won us the game, well, I’ll never be certain of that, but I do know that we – we didn’t lose 
the game because of it which was – which was obviously important. 
When probed further, Geoff said that he knew he had to make a decision, 
otherwise there was a higher chance of his team losing the game. Earlier the 
analysis highlighted that decisions are made to gain, retain or regain control of the 
situation throughout a match. However, in this high-pressured environment, where 
time was running out, the score was close, players were tired, Geoff felt he had only 
one option, one decision to make, that would hopefully help his team hold on to the 
small lead they had. Geoff explains: 
…but certainly I feel – I feel that if we had of kept going with what we did in that last four or 
five minutes, that the – the overwhelming pressure of the – the dam wall would have 
collapsed, like, it was just – it was just – the only control that I felt I had over – over the game 
was to manipulate the numbers behind the ball. 
The above examples highlight the perception that coach decisions do 
influence the game, although, it is unrealistic to say the decisions will win you the 
game. One can hope decisions influence the game enough to provide the team with 
an opportunity to win the game; however, there will always be uncertainty, especially 
from a head coach point of view throughout the decision making process as further 
discussed below.  
Uncertainty. Uncertainty was present throughout the process of the head 
coach making decisions. There was found to be uncertainty pre- and post-decision 
and uncertainty related to whether or not the player’s will in fact do as they are asked 
to do. Uncertainty pre-decision was specifically concerned with scanning personnel 
and individual players, how to use certain players, when to use a particular player, 
and which player to use. Geoff explains the potential uncertainty he faced pre- 
decision regarding how to use one of his best players: 
Well, where – where – will Jessie Jones play inside mid or will he play outside mid? Do you 
think that they’re going to run with him and, if they are, does playing him on the outside give – 
take away from his game but give us an advantage, or does playing him on the inside going 
head-to-head with that player, give us an advantage, or does playing him inside, and him 
playing on one of their players, give us an advantage two-to-one? (Geoff) 
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Another type of uncertainty related specifically to individual players was 
deciding which player to use, to achieve the required outcome. The below example, 
highlights how Geoff knew the solution to the problem, but he explains the second 
part to making the decision was about which player is chosen to outwork the 
required role.  
I think the first six minutes is evaluating obviously how to stop their ball movement quick and 
inside kicks. So, like as we rang down to the bench to the players we wanted, and yeah – so 
that’s the other side, and then the other discussion and main talking point is obviously what 
we do with their spare and who it is who equalizes. (Geoff) 
When is the right time to move a particular player into a new position? The 
timing of when to move a player can cause the head coach uncertainty. Geoff 
remembered a time of uncertainty in deciding when to direct a particular player to 
position himself as a spare in the backline. The situational problem caused by the 
opposition, was that in a short period of time Geoff’s team had given up a 4-goal 
lead. After the second goal scored by the opposition, Geoff new a decision needed 
to made but he was uncertain of when to make it, Geoff recalled: “I remember talking 
about it and I remember – as much as talking about it, I remember in my mind, just 
wrestling with it and when to do it” (Geoff).  
There was also uncertainty post-decision, in relation to how moving or 
changing an individual’s role would affect the game and whether or not the decision 
would achieve the desired outcome. Continuing with the last example, once Geoff 
made the decision, he was uncertain if the decision would get the outcome required 
and influence the game. Geoff recalls:  
Gee I hope it works! [I thought after the decision] Because it’s still giving them a little bit more 
chance of getting the ball inside 50, when you’ve taken a player from your attacking half into 
your defensive half. It’s sort of – you know, an also, you know, can we still score?  
Geoff’s team went onto win the game, however, he was uncertain as to 
whether or not the decision won them the game. He felt the decision did have an 
impact on the situation though, recalling: “Whether it won us the game, I’m not sure 
down the track, but I definitely think it was a decision that stopped the dam wall at 
that stage” (Geoff). With this example, it was perceived the decision influenced the 
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match, even though there was uncertainty before and after the decision was made. 
Evidence suggests uncertainty of a decision’s influence can co-exist with the 
perception that a decision can influence the match. However, decisions could not 
influence a match if the players choose not to do as they are asked.  
Compliance v non compliance. Players reported that they chose to comply 
or not comply with the coach’s decisions. The power of choice can bring uncertainty 
to whether or not decisions influence the game, because players can choose not to 
follow instructions. This type of uncertainty was extracted out of the data via the 
players’ own admissions. There were examples where players specifically noted 
times where they did not agree with the coach and chose to do what they thought 
was best, ignoring the coach’s directions. An example of this was: 
We started, like, hitting to, like, the open side in the centre bounce, to the side with no players 
and running onto it because we thought that – we kept doing the same thing and they were 
reading it pretty easy and it was quite obvious. We probably didn’t have our, like, best midfield 
in there, so I think coaches were trying to just kind keep it predictable for everyone. But I 
know that we sort of said, you know, sneakily, ‘Let’s just try doing this because…’ (Player) 
Uncertainty was evident and occurred at a variety of stages throughout the 
decision making process. However, the results reveal decisions were perceived to 
influence the game, especially when it came to control. Whether changing the 
defensive structure to regain control of the game or making a system decision to 
improve ball movement and retain control, decisions were perceived to influence the 
game. A decision influencing the game was found to have the potential to co-exist 
with uncertainty, however, emerging from the results were three potential ways to 
manage uncertainty.  
Managing uncertainty. The results suggested three ways the coach was 
able to potentially manage uncertainty 1. Building a team system based on rules; 2. 
Fostering trust and respect between players and coach; 3. Drawing on experience 
gained from coaching the game and the knowledge the coach had of the players 
within the team. The results provided evidence of a system, based on rules. One 
such example was every time the opposition put an extra player in defence, the team 
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would always ‘equalise’ (meaning the opposition did not have an extra player in their 
forward line; Geoff would equalise the number of players in the defence). Geoff 
mentioned: “We always equalise and we’ve had success with it” This component of 
the system was entrenched into the team, the players enforced the decision 
themselves.  
Geoff explains: 
So yeah – our first game plan thing is to equalise, so our players equalize and then we act on 
whether we want to change that decision and keep one back. So our players did the 
equalizing of players forward of centre for us to make it a 7 on 7. 
Trust and respect between players and coach was another theme and ties 
into the example mentioned about a team system with everyone being on the same 
page. This could be in regard to a team rule or perhaps an isolated instruction. One 
player explained an instruction that came down from the coach: “we might want to 
ice [run down] the clock a bit and the message will come out “Let’s ice the clock”, 
and we’ll make sure we play in that manner, so as a team that’s what we do”(Player). 
Trust and respect also directly helps manage the uncertainty of non-compliance of 
the player (as mentioned previously).  
Experience and Knowledge was the third theme related to ways in which the 
coach sought to manage uncertainty. Specifically this related to having intimate and 
detailed knowledge about the history of the players. Using the knowledge he had 
about individual players, Geoff’s description below was a good example of the coach 
recalling knowledge on an individual’s capabilities to change a previous decision. 
When probed to offer specific detail about why he changed a decision during a 
match, Geoff said: “he’s so creative with his feet and really sets up well. So that’s 
why I changed that decision”. 
Describing and Understanding Decisions 
Two higher order themes emerged from the data analysis to describe and 
understand how the head coach makes decisions in the coaches box on match day; 
Situational Assessment and Decisions Made (as seen in Figure 2). The higher order 
theme of Situational Assessment consists of two key categories: 1. Situational Story 
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and 2. Experience and Knowledge. The higher order theme of Decisions Made 
consisted of three categories: 1. Decision to Change a Player’s Role; 2. System 
Based Decisions; and 3. Decisions to Achieve an Outcome. The next section will 
report these findings starting with the higher order theme of Situational Assessment. 
  
Figure 2.A schematic of the higher order themes of ‘Situational Assessment’ 
and ‘Decisions Made’.  
 
Situational assessment. The higher order theme of situational assessment 
relates to an appraisal the head coach undertakes of situational problems throughout 
a match. This means the coach is assessing the situational problem to understand 
what is occurring on the field of play. The problem itself was predominantly related to 
either the actions of the opposition or the ineffectiveness of the coach’s own team 
(which could include the whole team, individual players, or a positional grouping of 
players) to respond to the opposition’s play. The two categories that underpin the 
assessment act as two individual steps or two parts, which form the assessment and 
hence the understanding of a situation (as seen in Figure 3). The category, 
Situational Story can be considered the first part of the assessment process, which is 
achieved by the coach scanning the game trying to understand the problem. The 
second part of the assessment process is related to the experience and knowledge 
of the coach, particularly the knowledge he has of his own players to help complete 
the assessment and take a decision. Below, an explanation of the two-part 
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assessment process (Figure 3) is reported starting with the part one: situational 
story, followed by part two: player knowledge. 
 
 
Figure 3. A model of the two-part situational assessment process of a problem 
which leads to a decision. 
 
Part one: situational story. When assessing the situational problem, the 
head coach gathers information from different sources to understand the trend of the 
game and build a story (interpretation) of the situation. Part one of the assessment 
process gathers and combines information sourced from people (i.e., assistant 
coaches), the current score, time (minutes played in a quarter), the weather, 
statistics, injury and fatigue, players and personnel. For example, Geoff provides an 
account of how he framed the problem and used a combination of different 
information sources to understand the trend of the game: 
Well, we drew it from the trend of the game – the clearances, we were getting well beaten.  
We also, as I said before, we – we realised that in the wet conditions that we were too top 
heavy in our forward line, so it was a means to helping both areas of the ground, but primarily 
to get the ball inside our half was the first aim because they’d had a lot of the play in that 
quarter, our backs were against the wall in terms of possession inside our forward half, and 
we just wanted to try and – try and win the ball out of congestion against probably a bigger 
bodied side, get it going our way and play with the smaller forward line. (Geoff) 
In the story example below, Geoff assesses a situational problem using the 
information sources of time, score, fatigue and injury. Story example one:  
…[Geoff’s team was] Under pressure against an opposition in the last quarter after we got, 
you know, four or five goals up…the last five or six minutes of the game, our players seemed 
to – seemed to have no run, we had two guys off injured, we were basically hanging onto the 
game. …We brought up a forward to play less in our forward line and play around the ball to 
try and help us get – get the footy and get it into our half…(Geoff) 
Part 1 Situational Story Part 2 Player Knowledge Decision Made 
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After Geoff made the initial decision, he continued to assess the situation. Because 
the decision did not influence the game as intended, he continued to understand the 
problem, drawing upon the sources of information available to him. He realised the 
initial outcome was not achieved, the opposition had momentum, the score was 
close, his team was ineffective due to injury and fatigue. Geoff explains: 
…we were unable to find enough of the ball and hang on – hang on to the ball for long 
enough, so we – we couldn’t – we couldn’t get enough marks and just control the tempo. The 
ball was – was continuously in motion, you know, using too much handball, all those sorts of 
things which affected our ability to actually take time off the clock… so when they got those 
couple of goals and the – the wave was moving in their direction, to obviously stop that, what 
we had to do – it wasn’t anything about stats on the game, it was just about visual and 
understanding that we did have two players off so we had little rotations… we had another 
guy who was on limited minutes… I could see after they got to within two goals that probably 
10 of our guys went into cramp stretch, so I knew we were struggling physically at the time, 
and that was – that was also used as – as – as cues to –that we had to do something. The 
trend of the game was that they’d kicked the last two goals, had it inside 50 repeatedly, and 
we had nothing left in the tank…” 
Geoff decided to move the same player from around the ball to play as 
seventh defender:  
…but then after the next couple of goals we abandoned that to move that player to just purely 
play a seventh defender behind the ball because we knew that there wasn’t long to go and we 
just couldn’t afford to give them any more – any more goals. (Geoff) 
The coach creates a story of the situational problem by continuously scanning 
the game to gather enough information from different sources. Once an 
understanding of the situation has been established the same information can 
become influential enough to act as a catalyst for a decision. Upon understanding 
the situation, the assessment process moved to part two. Part two was specifically 
concerned with the knowledge the coach had of each individual player. This 
knowledge helped the coach to take a decision and complete the story of the 
situational problem being assessed.  
Part two: player knowledge. The knowledge the coach had on individual 
players within his team was based on the history of their positional, role and 
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footballing capabilities. Players’ positional and role capabilities was concerned with 
the coach knowing what positions each player could or could not play, or what 
positions they had played in the past. Knowing the players’ footballing capabilities 
was concerned with knowing the strength and weaknesses of individual players with 
regard to technique, physical attributes and decision-making qualities.  
Once the situational problem was understood (part 1) the nature of the 
decision making process proceeded to the head coach going through two different 
levels of deliberation, regarding the use of his player/s`. First, the coach immediately 
knew which player/s to use to solve the situational problem; therefore, minimal to no 
deliberation was used and; second, the coach was uncertain, therefore having to 
scan the field and bench to identify the personnel available, meaning some 
deliberation was used. The following example provided demonstrates the coach 
immediately knowing which player to use, therefore minimal deliberation was 
needed;  
Story example two: Geoff’s team had a slender lead and there was only 10 
minutes to go in the game, with a win resulting in a home final. Geoff’s his main 
ruckman (player who contests the ball when it is thrown or bounced into the air by 
the umpire after stoppages) (Bill) got injured and he needed to be replaced. The 
coach replaced Bill with the other two tall players (Simon and Grant), who were to 
share the ruck responsibilities until the conclusion of the game. However, it was the 
performance of Simon that made the coach uncomfortable: “…he [Simon] went in 
and got his two to three minutes and I thought he’s being a bit uncompetitive here.” 
Geoff continued: “The un-competitiveness – the lack of strength around the contest 
and the vulnerability I felt from our side when Simon was in the ruck, it was evident”. 
Within the assessment process, the information gathered from continuously 
scanning the performance of an individual (post-decision) combined with the coach’s 
knowledge on individual players and personnel to inform a situational assessment. 
The knowledge the coach had of Simon was: “that player [Simon] hasn’t got credits 
in the bank with me in this area of the game” (Geoff). Geoff decided to replace 
Simon with Grant after 3 minutes of game time. Using the knowledge Geoff had 
55 
 
 
 55 
about Grant, Geoff believed Grant could do a superior job to what Simon could do. 
Geoff explained: “the competitiveness, the strengths around the ball, the ability to 
compete and one of them is superior at that, or I believe is superior at that.” Geoff 
ended up making the decision and Grant stayed in the ruck position for the last 7 
minutes of the game and his team held onto their lead and won the game. 
The above example highlights how the coach was able to immediately access 
the knowledge he had of the player and match the knowledge with the situational 
problem, to complete the situational story and take the decision. The second way the 
coach accesses knowledge of individual players once the situation was understood 
was to scan the personnel (e.g. tall players or defensive players) and/or individual 
players available. Scanning the players can help trigger the knowledge the coach 
already has regarding the history of their positional, role and football capabilities to 
make the decision. An example of scanning the personnel and individual players can 
be found in the following story;  
Story example three: It was quarter time and Geoff’s team was down by nine 
points, the opposition were on top and his side was getting beaten at stoppages. The 
team could not get the ball into their attacking half, the opposition had bigger bodies 
around the ball, and with the wet conditions they were probably too tall in the forward 
line. Going into quarter time, Geoff started thinking about moving a tall player from 
the forward line. When the second quarter started Geoff was continuously scanning 
his tall players assessing their performance and matching this to the knowledge he 
had on them, Geoff explains:  
I was looking at every tall we had up in the forward line, probably three plus another one off 
the bench, rolling through that ruck work as well. Whether one of them could play in the back 
line, which I didn’t feel they had the – I suppose, the experience and the – the footy – footy 
DNA to – to play the role on the day. 
Geoff made the decision to use one of his tall players who can play in the 
ruck, to go on the wing and act as a second jumper (ruck man), to achieve the 
outcome of trying and get the ball moving forward.  
So we made a decision to move a player, one of our taller players, and move him up onto a 
wing and get him to be the second jumper – jumper for ruck contests with our ruckman as 
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well, and just try and get the ball going forward and out of congestion with some – some ball 
movement our way from the stoppage. (Geoff) 
To do this he used the knowledge he had regarding the history of their 
positional, role and football capabilities to come to a decision of which player could 
outwork the job. However, it was not until the information came in from one of the 
sources that the decision triggered and a particular player was thought of. Geoff 
recalled: 
But once the – the clearances came in the second quarter in their favour and I thought how –
how do we get something going around the ball, it probably – probably came to me that this 
guy, because he’s athletic – and look, he has played wing last year…  
Knowledge of individual players is an important component when it comes to 
completing the situational story. Whether the coach needs to scan the personnel 
and/or individual players or he feature matches the situational problem with a player 
straight away, knowledge of the player is important. Once the player is chosen the 
decision can be made.  
Decision made. Predominately a decision made includes changing an 
individual/s role to achieve an outcome that solves the situational problem. The 
decision to change a player’s role can affect the team as a whole (e.g., team 
structure) and on an individual level can influence a player’s performance (positively 
or negatively). The following is an example of Geoff changing an individual’s role and 
how it affected the whole team structurally: “Well the player – the forward line player 
moves to the backline, takes a player and frees up one of the defenders  … Yeah, in 
simple terms, yeah. Because if that – if he doesn’t play ruck, then everything else 
changes around the ground.”(Geoff) 
The other consideration is the effect the decision has on the individual and 
how the individual player responds in a different role, especially if they have not 
played their before or are not expecting to play there. One of the runners explains his 
views from the experience he’s had delivering messages from the head coach to the 
players: 
I think players have varying abilities to do that. Some players can adjust really well and even 
though something’s been drilled into them, if they get a different structure they weren’t 
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expecting, they’re able to alter and then refocus and do it that way. Whereas I think other 
players struggle with that. They’ve been so, you know, throughout the week, programmed, 
yeah exactly right to do this, and then if something’s – a bit of a curve ball’s thrown at them, 
some of them have trouble, you know, reprogramming what their role is. (Runner) 
Either way, once the decision has been made, constant assessment of the 
decision is carried out by the coach because of the effect it can have on individuals, 
the team and the game. Moreover, decisions made are predominately based around 
moving individual/s positions, therefore knowledge of individual/s is vital and 
understanding the effect this can have on individual/s, the team and the game needs 
to be considered. 
In summarising the results, the first consideration was that the head coach’s 
decisions were perceived to influence the game. Specifically, relating to gaining, 
retaining or regaining control of the game. The head coach did face uncertainty pre 
and post decisions and there was the added uncertainty of whether or not the 
players would comply or not with the decisions the coach made. In addition, making 
decisions from the coaches’ box on match day is best described as a two-part 
assessment process based around a situational problem. The two parts combine 
together to help the coach complete the assessment process and take the decision. 
Part one was building a story of the situational problem using a variety of information 
sources, which involved continual assessment of the situation post, the initial 
decision. Part two is concerned with the depth of player knowledge the coach holds 
and how this affects the taking of the decision to solve the situational problem. The 
more depth of knowledge, the more likely the decision will be taken quickly. The next 
section will discuss the findings and what the results mean and how it is situated 
within current literature. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The research set out to examine how an Australian Rules Football Head 
Coach makes decisions in the coaches’ box on match day. Two main questions 
guided this research study, 1. Are head coach decisions perceived to influence the 
game on match day? and; 2. How does a head coach make decisions on match 
day? It was important to establish whether or not coach decisions are perceived to 
influence the match, because if they did not influence the match, there would be little 
imperative to examine the decisions a coach makes. Examining a coach making 
decisions in the box on match day occurs in an environment in which the head coach 
operates with a group of people in a confined space, where uncertainty of assessing 
situations and making decisions is high. This environment is high-pressured due to 
the limited time available (time-pressured), and is often further compounded by the 
relative score and the consequences a win or loss can have from historical, financial 
and social perspectives.  
The head coach makes decisions on match day by completing a two-part 
assessment process based around a situational problem, which allows a decision to 
be taken. The situational problem was predominately caused by the opposition or the 
coach’s own teams’ ineffectiveness in responding to the oppositional play. Part one 
of the assessment process is the coach building a story of the situation using 
information sources (i.e., statistics, weather, score, time, assistant coaches) to 
understand the problem. Once the problem has been framed, the coach moves into 
part two of the process to complete the assessment and take the decision. Taking 
the decision is achieved by using the knowledge the coach has of individual players 
and personnel within the team to complete the story and potentially solve the 
problem. Players’ and runners’  perceptions are that coach decisions to solve football 
problems do influence the game. The coach too believes decisions can influence the 
game; however, there was more uncertainty of the influence of this decision on the 
game.     
The next section will discuss three main themes in relation to the results. First, 
the notion of control is explored as is the scope of the coach’s influence on situations 
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through decisions made. The discussion will seek to link the notion of a slow 
interactive script with semi-deliberative decision making, as well as questioning and 
explaining what happens on a cognitive level when the pressure in the game is at its 
highest level, and how the decisions made do not guarantee a win, even if the 
decision influences the situation in a positive manner. The second main area of the 
discussion relates to the two-part assessment process of story building and player 
knowledge. In part one there will be an emphasis on story building including an 
understanding of how a situational story is built, by describing what information can 
be used to build a story and linking the information sources with existing literature, 
including key attractors (Harvey, Lyle, & Muir, 2015). In part two, player knowledge is 
considered with an emphasis on the role this knowledge plays in the completion of 
the coach’s mental model and how player knowledge links with existing terminology 
used in current literature. The third area of the discussion relates to the proposal of 
two levels of semi-deliberative decision-making existing throughout a game, 
depending on the situation being faced. 
Assessment Process 
The head coach made decisions throughout a game by engaging in a two-part 
assessment process. It is this decision-making process there are two parts: (i) 
Situational story; and (ii) Player Knowledge combine or “interact” (p.14), allowing the 
coach to form a mental model, that represents an understanding (Côté et al., 1995) 
of a situation the s/he would like to achieve from their decision. The researcher’s aim 
of splitting the assessment process into two parts is to provide simplicity to a 
complex assessment process. Both parts of the assessment process are important, 
however, part two of the process regarding understanding the amount and accuracy 
of knowledge a coach holds of each individual player is what allows the decision to 
be taken. Personnel and player knowledge is used to change an individual/s position 
or role that, in turn, can influence the situation to gain or regain control of the game. 
The two-part assessment process is discussed below, including the complexity of 
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building the situational story and the role player knowledge plays in taking the 
decision. 
Building a situational story. Although part two of the process allows the 
decision to be taken, the coach still needs an accurate understanding of the 
situational problem; otherwise the quality of the decision made might have minimal 
impact and therefore not influence the outcome of the situation. To understand the 
situational problem, the coach frames the problem by building a story. The story is 
built by continuously scanning the game, which allows the coach to collect the 
appropriate information to frame the situational problem. The use and terminology of 
problem framing and story building to describe coach cognitions is consistent with 
existing coaching literature (e.g., Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010). Problem framing 
and story building are formed by the coach to make sense of a particular situation as 
is occurring in part one of the decision making process. The head coach gathers 
information and constructs the knowledge via a slow interactive script, allowing the 
coach to build up a scenario to deal with either serial or unfolding situations (Harvey 
et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010). 
Building a scenario with a slow interactive script is a complex process; 
knowing and understanding what information to look for, how different information 
relates and matches up with each other, the affect information has on the situation, 
and the influence information has on the coach. The complexity of part one in the 
two-part assessment process is the amount of potential information available to the 
coach. Specifically the numerous equations of information combining together and 
the cognitive organisation required building a story to understand the situation. By 
the coach understanding the situational problem it is safe to say s/he knows what 
information to look for. Additionally the coach must know and understand if and how 
the information relates and affects to each other to be able to build an accurate story 
of the situation. If the coach does not know what information to look for, the 
representation of the situation will not be accurate (Côté et al., 1995) and the 
decision is unlikely to influence the game. Knowing what information to look for and 
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how different information relates to each other comes down to knowledge and 
experience of the coach. 
Knowledge and previous experience allows the expert coach to feature match 
(Klein, 2009) the information gathered with previous experiences (Lyle, 2010) to 
recognise situations. “Feature matching” (Klein, 2009, p. 290) allows the coach to 
build the situational story. In other words, the expert coach gathers and combines 
the information presented by the situation to understand the situational problem. In 
story example one under the heading part one: situational story, Geoff used his vast 
coaching experience to match features. With his initial decision Geoff wanted to 
control the tempo and take time off the clock, by continually scanning, Geoff 
matched the features to conclude the outcome was not being achieved, for example 
Geoff explains the features: 1. “…we were unable to find enough of the ball and 
hang on – hang on to the ball for long enough,” 2. “…we couldn’t get enough marks” 
3. “The ball was – was continuously in motion”, 4. “…using too much handball”. 
These features were matched and Geoff concluded his team was not controlling the 
tempo of the game and therefore not taking time off the clock. To further highlight the 
complexity of the assessment process, Geoff was then able to match the conclusion 
of the outcome not being achieved with other relevant information and conclusions 
(i.e, oppositions momentum, score, own players cramping) to build an overall story. If 
Geoff did not have the experience and knowledge to match features and form 
conclusions, there is the potential of the head coach to miss or not understand the 
situation, let alone an accurate representation of the entire situation. As Côté et al. 
(1995) explains: “when coaches activated several properties of knowledge 
simultaneously, they mentally formed a complex and possibly unique problem 
situation” (p. 14), as is in the example provided with Geoff. Côté et al. (1995) 
continues to explain: “the nature of this organisation determined the quality, 
completeness and coherence of the mental model used that, in turn, determined the 
efficiency of the knowledge applied” (p. 14). In other words, the quality of knowledge 
and how it is organised determines the depth of understanding regarding the story. 
This evidence from existing literature and the data reinforces the importance of 
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knowledge and experience a head coach needs to feature match incidents and 
conclusions, organise the information accurately to understand the situation and 
have a mental model which is complete, coherent and of a high quality. 
While the coach is gathering and organising information to understand the 
situational problem, an event might occur to complete the story or be strong enough 
to enforce a decision straight away. These specific events are known as “key 
attractors” (Lyle, 2010, p. 31) and occur throughout a situation, helping the coach to 
recognise or frame a problem (Harvey et al., 2015). This means a key attractor can 
be an event sourced from the categories (e.g., statistics, weather etc.), which provide 
the information to form the situational story. If the information sourced is strong 
enough, irrelevant of whether there are multiple pieces of information coming 
together or just one or two strong pieces of information (for example, an individual’s 
poor performance as found in story example two under the heading of part two: 
player knowledge of the results section) the information can act as a “catalyst” 
(Harvey et al., 2015, p. 160). A catalyst can be deemed as an attractor strong 
enough to trigger a decision. For example, the key attractors acting, as catalysts for 
a decision in the example above (story example one), were the score and the fatigue 
of Geoff’s players: 
 I could see after they got to within two goals that probably 10 of our guys went into cramp 
stretch, so I knew we were struggling physically at the time, and that was – that was also 
used as – as – as cues to –that we had to do something. (Geoff) 
In the same example, there were other attractors gathered from continuously 
scanning the situation which were Geoff’s team’s inability “to actually take time off 
the clock…” (Geoff). This attractor helped form the story but did not act as a catalyst 
for the decision. Meaning the head coach can continuously scan, until key attractor/s 
become strong enough to act as a catalyst for a decision and not all key attractors 
become catalysts.  
In summary, the coach builds a story of a situational problem by feature 
matching information. The quality of information gathered and matched together 
determines the quality and accuracy of the story. While building these stories an 
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event may occur known as key attractors (Lyle, 2010).  A key attractor can either add 
to the story to help make the understanding of the situational problem stronger, or be 
strong enough as an isolated event, to act as a catalyst for an immediate decision. 
Once the coach understands the situational problem or there’s a catalyst resulting in 
an immediate decision, attention turns to what decision needs to be made to gain or 
regain control of the situation and therefore the game.  
Player knowledge. Once the coach has an understanding of the situational 
problem or there is a catalyst for an immediate decision, the coach’s decision turns 
to choosing which player/s are going to be used to help complete the assessment, 
take the decision and bring the modelled situation to life. Not only choosing which 
player/s to use can bring uncertainty for the coach pre-decision but, how and when 
to use them are important considerations. If the coach has knowledge on his/her 
players this could potentially affect the amount of uncertainty pre- and post-decision. 
Prior to making the decision the coach should have as much knowledge regarding 
the history or “historicity” (Harvey et al., 2015, p. 158) of each player’s positional and 
role capabilities including knowing their footballing capabilities (i.e., technique, 
physical attribute, decision making). Harvey et al. (2015) relates historicity to the 
knowledge the coach carries of personnel or players within the team on game day. 
The coach uses historicity and footballing capabilities of each individual player to 
complete the story and take the decision. In story example two, the last 5 minutes of 
the game Geoff was not happy with the performance of Simon (position: ruckman), 
therefore, he decided to change Simon with Grant. Geoff chose Grant because he 
knew the history of Grant’s positional (i.e.: ruckman) and role capabilities including 
his footballing capabilities, Geoff explains: “the competitiveness, the strengths 
around the ball, the ability to compete.” Geoff was able to take the decision relatively 
quickly, resulting in Grant helping to control the situation, influence the game 
accordingly and in this case the team happened to win the game. The level of 
knowledge Geoff had affected the accuracy of his representation of what the player 
could produce. As explained by Côté et al. (1995), “The accuracy of the 
representation depends on the level of knowledge of the coach who constructs the 
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model” (p. 14). If the coach does not have this knowledge, it is safe to presume there 
will be greater uncertainty of whether the player chosen can bring the coach’s model 
of the situation to life.  
However, uncertainty regarding players is not just related to the outcome of 
the decision. The coach faces uncertainty pre-decision deciding how, when and 
which player/s to use. This means there is uncertainty in making the actual decision 
itself and whether or not the modelled situation, the coach wants to achieve would be 
able to come to life. Therefore, managing the uncertainty related to the use of 
players, comes back to the level and accuracy of knowledge a coach has. The more 
detailed knowledge a coach has (i.e. historicity, players footballing capabilities), the 
less uncertainty s/he faces. One of the techniques of coping with uncertainty is to 
reduce uncertainty by gathering more information (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). 
Additional information can be gathered by the coach while scanning the game; for 
example, observing an injured player (as mentioned in story example two), or 
observing a player showing signs of fatigue (as mentioned in story example one) or 
identifying a player playing poorly. This additional information can combine with 
historicity and individual footballing capabilities to enable the coach to cope with 
some uncertainty. Apart from adding the additional information through scanning, the 
coach needs to use the information s/he already has to decide on a course of action. 
But, how is this achieved? The coach decides by using the existing mental model of 
that particular player, which is “nested” (Abraham and Collins, 2011, p. 380). This 
means the experience and knowledge a coach has of each individual player has 
been built, into a mental model, representing the capabilities a player can offer. 
Through decision experiences involving players, a coach strengthens the nested 
mental model. Decisions made throughout coaching practice are “embedded” (p. 
380) “or become nested for the coach’s medium term agendas which themselves are 
linked to (nested within) longer term aims” (Abraham & Collins, 2011, p. 380). This 
means the coach’s representation of each individual player strengthens with more 
experiences and can be used to solve future situational problems. The stronger the 
mental model of each player, the more depth of knowledge the coach has, meaning 
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less time might be needed to deliberate on the decision. If the coach does not have 
depth of knowledge s/he may take longer to decide which player to use, therefore 
deliberating on the decision for a longer period of time. Therefore, in the context of 
deciding how, when, and which player/s to use to solve the situational problem, it 
could be argued there are two levels of deliberation. 
Two Levels of Deliberation.  
There are potentially two levels of deliberation relating to the decision of using 
personnel and individuals within the team to solve a football problem. These can be 
deemed as ‘Less Deliberative’ and ‘More Deliberative’ decision making. Within the 
NDM paradigm, Lyle (2010) explains that semi-deliberative decision making is the 
most appropriate way to describe a coach’s decision making throughout practice. 
Therefore, if there is less and more deliberation throughout a game and coaching 
throughout a game is best described as semi-deliberative, it is safe to conclude there 
are two levels of semi-deliberative decision making. Any suggestion less deliberative 
decision making should be classified as non deliberative decision making can be 
quickly ruled out as there is “no suggestion that the coach’s behaviour is (or should 
be!) completely without conscious deliberation” (Lyle, 2010, p. 28). Therefore, the 
head coach who makes decisions while coaching a match, depending on the 
situation, either makes decisions with more time to deliberate or takes decisions with 
less time to deliberate and this all occurs throughout semi-deliberative decision 
making. Determining the level of deliberation is not necessarily subjected to a single 
parameter such as how much time is left in the game, but can be determined by the 
nature or complexity of the problem, or historicity, in relation to personnel and this 
relationship with the current game situation. Below the two levels of deliberation 
within a live match situation are discussed. More deliberative decision making 
throughout a game can be linked back to the second example of part two: player 
knowledge in the results section, where there is more time to deliberate on which 
player to choose. The more time to deliberate suits the understanding that a coach’s 
cognition is a slow interactive script. This is because Geoff had time to scan the 
game, build the story to understand the situation and scan the personnel and players 
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to complete the model.  On the other hand the head coach maybe forced into 
deliberation due to the lack of historicity or uncertainty of how to best use a player in 
which his/her historicity is strong. For example as mentioned under the heading of 
uncertainty within the results section, Geoff was deliberating on how and where to 
use his best player, the coach wanted to use the player effectively for the benefit of 
his team and thwart the opposition at the same time. This situation highlights the two 
levels of deliberation is not only determined by the concept of time vs no time, but by 
the nature of the situation and historicity, additionally adding weight to the complexity 
of the assessment process and the importance of historicity and the role it plays 
within the decision making process.   
 Less deliberative decision making occurs in a high pressured environment, 
caused by minimal time left in the game and/or the score as mentioned in story 
example one under the heading of part one: situational story, and example story two, 
under the heading of part two: player knowledge. Less deliberative can also occur 
within a system based on rules, as mentioned in the first example related to 
equalising, under the heading managing uncertainty. Historicity too, can cause less 
deliberation, meaning the coach can feature match a player with the situation, 
irrelevant of the score or time. As illustrated in the last example under the heading, 
managing uncertainty, where the head coach’s knowledge of a particular player 
means the decision needs little deliberation. In any of these scenarios, the head 
coach can either feel in complete control or have very little control; either way 
because the deliberation is less, the cognitive script used by the coach can be 
perceived as not being slow. This perception comes down to the nature and 
complexity of the situation i.e. pressure of the situation score, time left, players 
fatiguing, historicity, regarding which player to choose. To complete the assessment 
process, the coach needs to quickly understand the situation and match the player to 
the situation through the hierarchical organisation of the mental models and take the 
decision.    
 In summary, a coach making decisions throughout a game is best described 
as semi-deliberative and the discussion suggests breaking semi-deliberative 
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decision making up into two levels, less and more deliberative decision making. The 
level of deliberation can be determined by the nature or complexity of the problem 
and/or historicity, in relation to personnel and the relationship with the current game 
situation. Throughout the two levels of semi-deliberation the coach continues with a 
two-part assessment process to take a decision, aiming to influence the game by 
retaining, or regaining control of the situation.  
The Influence of a Decision 
Control. The intent to control a situation (and the game) comes about from 
match day being a contested activity between two head coaches and their teams. 
The two head coaches are wrestling for control in an attempt to have the game most 
representative of their plans (i.e., working to the strengths of their own players or 
team, or seeking to exploit a weakness in opposition players or team). This relates to 
situations where they are seeking to regain control or retaining control of the 
situation (or game). For example, Geoff talked about getting the game “back on our 
terms” (Geoff). In effect, he is referring to the need to make decisions in an attempt 
to retain control of a situation and in turn the game. In another example, a player 
explains his understanding of a decision to retain control of the game: 
Just control the game. We were up and just needed to control the game, run the clock down 
and keep it in our favour; just hold onto the ball, just manage the time and make sure we have 
possession [Player] 
 The whole notion of a coach making decisions based on control, supports 
existing literature (e.g., Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010), where the coach tries to 
control a situation to match what was initially planned or what has emerged 
throughout the duration of the match. Above, when Geoff talks about getting the 
game ‘back on our terms’, the implication is that the situation or the game is not 
being played out in ways that were originally planned or envisaged. Depending on 
the information available, the coach may have to refine or re-evaluate his mental 
model, and change what control represents and how it is achieved within that 
particular situation. For example, in the results under the heading of coach 
perceptions, Geoff reported that he was losing control of the flow of the game and 
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identified he had too many tall players in the forward line. He still wanted to control 
the flow of the ball, however, the way in which this was represented on the field of 
play was different to what was originally planned. Therefore the mental 
representation of what control or in this case ‘back on our terms’ looked like was 
different to when the match first started.  
Control can be classified as an outcome a coach is trying to achieve, through 
a process of re-evaluation (Côté et al., 1995) and refining mental models via a slow 
interactive script (Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010). For example, one particular 
situational story reported in the results explained the scores were close with Geoff’s 
team leading, but they were fatigued and had no momentum. Geoff had already 
made a decision a few minutes prior to put an extra player into the midfield. Upon 
reassessment, it was adjudged that that particular decision was not working and 
Geoff decided: “to manipulate the numbers behind the ball” (Geoff). He made this 
decision because as he said it was “the only control that I felt I had” (Geoff). 
Although this can be interpreted as a desperate decision, it is not. Geoff’s experience 
allows one option to be available to him. This is consistent with NDM literature where 
experts do not compare options and “making a decision means committing oneself to 
a course of action” (Klein, 2008, p. 457). The coach is able to commit without 
comparing due to the hierarchical organisation of mental models (Abraham & Collins, 
2011). Therefore, Geoff committed to manipulate the numbers behind the ball, he did 
not compare options because it was the only control he felt he had. 
 In regards to Geoff’s initial decision of the above situation, the decision did not 
influence the situation as he was expecting. Therefore, Geoff had to re-evaluate and 
refine the model, make a new decision, so the situation occurring on the field would 
be influenced and represent his new model. This cognitive theory is consistent with 
existing literature where “changes to a mental model could occur until the 
relationship between the model and the environment is adequate for achieving the 
goal” (Côté et al., 1995, p. 14). This process highlights continuous scanning and 
assessment of the situation after an initial decision and an element of deliberation, to 
allow the head coach to reconsider potential outcomes. The element of deliberation 
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mentioned ties well into the previously mentioned descriptor of coaches’ decision 
making being semi-deliberative, coming to the most appropriate decision on an 
ongoing basis (Lyle, 2010). There was time after the first decision was made, to 
continue to scan, assess and engage in some sort of deliberation to make a new and 
appropriate decision. Although there was an element of deliberation, due to the 
nature of the situation, the deliberation level can be perceived as ‘less deliberative’. 
Implications for Coach Development 
Coach development is based on ongoing learning and viewing the coach, as a 
learner will “develop an understanding of their working knowledge” (Cushion et al., 
2010). This working knowledge will help improve coaches’ decision making, which 
“plays an important part in coaches’ everyday practice” (Lyle, 2010, p. 27) including 
match day coaching. Decision making is an important area of ongoing empirical 
enquiry and necessary to guide coach development, whether informal, formal or 
experiential. This section provides some ideas for the coach as learner and 
developers to improve the process of decision taking by the coach on match day.  
Conceptualising the model as two parts was an attempt by the researcher to 
try and provide simplicity to a complex assessment process and in turn may help 
coach developers to break up the formal learning process into two sections: (i) 
Describing and Understanding how a story is built; and (ii) Understanding the 
importance and the type of player knowledge needed to help take the decision. In 
relation to describing and understanding how a story is built coach educators can 
discuss with coaches, how to understand and recognise problem situations 
throughout a game. Coach educators can use the information identified (statistics, 
weather, score, time, injury and fatigue, opposition and performance) to build and 
add depth of knowledge to a story of a specific situation. Coach educators and 
developers can put together various mock scenarios teaching coaches what features 
to look for within a particular situation and understanding the effects information 
would have on that situation. In terms of player knowledge, coach educators can 
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assist and help the coach to identify and match player capabilities to the situational 
problem, increasing the chance of the decision influencing the game.  
Through the use of “experiential learning” (Cushion et al., 2010, p. 27) with 
mediation (from coach developers or mentors) or without, coaches can be 
encouraged to intentionally improve their historicity. Meaning, deliberately adding 
depth of knowledge regarding each individual players team, positional and 
footballing capabilities built from previous experiences. Improving historicity can be 
achieved in several ways including: playing players in different position, assigning 
different roles, and putting players in challenging circumstances. The coach educator 
can encourage the coach to reflect by using two of Gilbert and Trudel (2001) 
reflection techniques, “reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action” (p. 30) to “support 
the experiential learning” (Cushion et al., 2010, p. ii). Reflection-on-action occurs 
while the game is being played out and reflection-on-action should occur in between 
games (Gilbert & Trudel, 2001). Overall, experiential learning will provide coaches 
with the knowledge of their own players’ capabilities and build historicity. Developing 
coaches’ expertise regarding, story building, historicity and footballing capabilities 
“requires the relevant knowledge” (Cushion et al., 2010, p. iv), which has been 
provided throughout the explanation of the decision taking process by a coach on 
match day. 
Coach educators and developers can use formal learning to create 
awareness regarding the importance of having sound historicity. Specifically, (and as 
mentioned above) historicity regarding understanding player positional, role and 
footballing capabilities including but not limited to: technical, decision making and 
physical characteristics, in all situations, guiding coaches’ learning about what these 
characteristics might look like in certain players and in what specific situations these 
skill sets can be used in, will help to improve coaches’ working knowledge and 
therefore decision making capabilities.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Australian Rules football is an original game, which is historically significant, 
financially important and socially relevant. From a coach education and development 
perspective, professional learning within the AFL is limited and the coaches’ box 
deemed the most challenging task for coaches (Mallett et al., 2007). Using the NDM 
framework (Lipshitz et al., 2001; Lyle, 2010) the decision making of an AFL head 
coach in the box on match day was examined. The purpose of the study was to 
describe and understand how an AFL head coach made decisions in the coaches’ 
box throughout live matches. Foundational to this examination was the aim of 
establishing whether or not a head coach’s decision influenced the game. If the 
decisions did not influence the game there would be little reason to continue.  
Decisions made by the head coach were perceived to influence the game, by 
the players, runners and head coach. The perception of influence was measured by 
whether or not the team could control the situations the decision was aimed at 
impacting. This task of controlling situations and the game more broadly was made 
harder due to the game being a contested activity between two teams led by two 
opposing coaches. Both coaches make decisions to control situations and therefore 
the game. Control is classified as retaining or regaining the situation.  
The notion of control supported existing literature that described coach 
decision making as semi-deliberative, coming to the most appropriate decision on an 
on going basis with the use of a slow interactive script (Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 
2010). Throughout all parts of a match the coach can attempt to control a changing 
situation if the coach can understand what control looks like within that particular 
situation. This involves the coach continuously scanning and assessing situations, 
with an element of deliberation allowing the coach to reconsider potential outcomes 
to the changing situation.  
Decisions on match day were described and understood as a complex 
assessment process, which to simplify, the researcher broke up into two parts. Part 
one: situational story and, part two: player knowledge. As a complete process the 
complexity is related to the head coach accurately knowing what information or key 
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attractors to look for, organising the information accurately by feature matching key 
attractors to form a conclusion, and understanding the potentially numerous 
combinations of features to form a conclusion and in turn the potential number of 
conclusions to form a story. The key attractors were gathered from continuously 
scanning the game gathering information (i.e. weather, statistics, score, time, game 
trends etc.) and accessing pre-existing knowledge (i.e. historicity and individual’s 
footballing capabilities). Key attractors could too act as a catalyst for a decision, if 
deemed strong enough, such as the ones mentioned in the discussion, poor player 
performance, fatigue of numerous players combined with the score however, not all 
key attractors become catalysts (i.e. the teams inability to try and take time off the 
clock).  
Overall, these findings support existing coaching literature regarding 
describing and understanding how the coach cognitively operates within the NDM 
paradigm, for example describing a coach’s decision making as semi-deliberative, 
coming to the most appropriate decision on an on going basis, the use of a slow 
interactive script, story building (Harvey et al., 2015; Lyle, 2010) and feature 
matching (Klein, 2009). Including the importance of accuracy, efficiency and 
organisation of knowledge and the role this plays in understanding a complex and 
unique football problem (Côté et al., 1995). However, the identification, of the types 
of information which forms key attractors and the importance the role historicity and 
pre-exisiting knowledge plays has added depth to understanding the process of 
coach’s decision taking.  
An underlying theme throughout the discussion was the existence of less and 
more deliberation within semi-deliberative decision making. As mentioned earlier, 
describing coach’s decision making as semi-deliberative is consistent with existing 
coaching literature (Lyle, 2010). Less and more deliberative decision making can be 
used throughout the entire decision taking process and can be determined by 
either/or time available, the nature or complexity of the problem, historicity (or lack 
there of) and its relationship with current game situation. More deliberative decision 
making throughout the decision taking process is consistent with existing literature in 
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describing the coaches’ cognitive structure as a slow interactive script. However, 
when there is less time to deliberate, there was still an element of deliberation, 
however this may not be perceived as being slow. This concept does not challenge 
current research but opens the door to a deeper understanding of the taking of 
decisions by the coach on match day throughout different situations.      
Further Research  
Further research should look into coach’s decision making throughout a game 
and unpack whether or not there is merit to there being multiple levels of semi-
deliberation. Identify decisions throughout a live match in various team sports, 
(whether bench coaching or in a box) understanding the situation and the 
environment the decision has taken place and including whether or not the coach 
has used differing levels of deliberation. Once this has been achieved, research 
should continue exploring why the coach has needed more or less time to deliberate 
on a decision and how deliberation type has impacted on the game. The result to this 
research will help to explain the difference between the levels of deliberation, 
regarding when they occur throughout a game and what are the information sources 
or key attractors which make a decision more or less deliberative. Achieving this 
would guide coach developers into potentially targeting the different deliberative 
levels of semi-deliberative decision making to improve coaches’ decisions on match 
day throughout all types of situations.  
Due to the perception of a coach’s decisions influencing the game, further 
research might examine the impact of the decision made. Understanding what it is 
the coach is trying to achieve and what effect did the decision have on the players’ 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviours, as well as the opposition and game as a whole? 
Was the desired outcome based on controlling the situation achieved? One potential 
way of contributing to understanding the impact of coach decisions might be to 
quantify the situation through statistics, did the match data support the outcome 
achieved? Additionally, research could look at whether or not match data supported 
the situational scenario built by the coach, potentially assessing the quality and 
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accuracy of the story. However, a reliance only on quantitative data will limit the 
richness of understanding this complex topic. 
Limitations 
A limitation of the study related to the player focus groups. The logistics of 
assembling the focus groups meant that there were difficulties in securing 
appropriate times and the number of participants in each was unbalanced. A better 
situation would have been three groups of three or a group of four and a group of 
five. This would have provided more opportunities for discussion between the 
players (a key advantage of focus groups). 
A potential limitation related to the immediacy of the recall. The stimulated 
recall interviews were conducted two days after each match. This presented the 
potential for the coach to leave the cognitive process involved with decision, opening 
up to the coach reflection instead of recall (Lyle, 2003). Unfortunately, due to 
availability (e.g., coach commitments post-game) and other logistics (e.g., accessing 
match footage, compiling split-screen footage) this situation could not be helped. 
With limited other options, a phone call was made the next day to the participant to 
probe his recall on the critical decisions he had made. This technique was used to 
show care in the process and reduce memory decay (Lyle, 2003). 
Another aspect that should be incorporated in future research designs in 
similar projects is the use of note taking whilst pre reading transcriptions. This has 
the potential to help the researcher to get a sense of scope and to check for topics 
that occur and re-occur, for emerging themes where hunches and ideas are captured 
and is the first step in the development of categories (Tesch, 1990). 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 75 
References 
Abraham, A., & Collins, D. (2011). Taking the next step: Ways forward for coaching 
science. Quest, 63, 366-384.  
Abraham, A., Collins, D., & Martindale, R. (2006). The coaching schematic: 
Validation through expert coach consensus. Journal of Sport Sciences, 24(6), 
549-564. doi: 10.1080/02640410500189173 
American Sport Education Program. (2002). Match-Day Coaching (3rd ed.). USA: 
Human Kinetics. 
Anderson, J. I. (2007). Game-day coaching in team sports. Coaching Update, 22(3).  
Armour, R. (1986). Sideline coaching. Polo, 12(4).  
Australian Football League. (2010). Highlights of 2010. Retrieved from 
http://s.afl.com.au/staticfile/AFL%20Tenant/AFL/Files/afl_annual_report_2010
.pdf   
Australian Football League. (2014). Annual report (Report No. 118). Retrieved from 
http://www.afl.com.au/afl-hq/annual-reports  
Australian Football League. (n.d.). AFL history. Retrieved from 
http://www.afl.com.au/development/aflexplained/history/tabid/10296/default.as
px 
Australian Football League Coaches Association. (2009). Who we are. Retrieved 
from http://aflca.com.au/index.php?id=11 
Australian Football League Coaches Association. (2011). State of play: AFL 
Coaches Association Annual Report 2011.  
Barzansky, B., Berner, E., & Beckman, R. R. C. (1983). Evaluation of a clinical 
program. Evaluation & Health Professions, 8(2), 193-208. doi: 
10.1177/016327878500800205 
Bossard, C., Kermarrec, G., Benard, R., De Loor, P., & Tisseau, J. (2009, June). 
Investigate naturalistic decision making of football players to design virtual 
environment. Paper presented at the Proceedings of NDM9, the Ninth 
International Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, London, UK. 
76 
 
 
 76 
Boutmans, J., & Swillen, J. (1989). Time-Out: Key to successful coaching. Paper 
presented at the Proceedings of the Maccabiah-Wngate International 
Congress, Israel. 
Brewer, F. W., & Treyens, C. J. (1981). Role of schemata in memory for places. 
Cognitive Psychology, 13, 207-230. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(81)90008-6 
Côté, J., Salmela, J., Baria, A., & Russell, S. (1993). Organizing and interpreting 
unstructured qualitative data. The Sport Psychologist, 7, 127-137.  
Côté, J., Salmela, J., Trudel, P., Baria, A., & Russell, S. (1995). The coaching model: 
A grounded assessment of expert gymnastic coaches' knowledge. Journal of 
Sport and Exercise Psychology, 17(1), 1-17. Retrieved from 
http://journals.humankinetics.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/AcuCustom/Siten
ame/Documents/DocumentItem/8925.pdf 
Crowther-Heyck, H. (1999). George A.Miller, language, and the computer metaphor 
of mind. History of Psychology, 2(1), 37-64.  
Cushion, C., Nelson, L., Armour, K., Lyle, J., Jones, R., Sandford, R., & O'Callaghan, 
C. (2010). Coach Learning and Development: A Review of Literature. Sports 
Coach UK: The National Coaching Foundation. Retrieved from 
https://www.sportscoachuk.org/sites/default/files/Coach-Learning-and-Dev-
Review.pdf 
Debanne, T., & Fontayne, P. (2009). A study of a successful experienced elite 
handball coach's cognitive processes in competition situations. International 
Journal of Sports Science & Coaching, 4(1), 1-16. doi:  
10.1260/1747-9541.4.1.1 
Fielding, G. N., & Fielding, L. J. (1986). Linking data. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, Inc. 
Gilbert, D. W., Trudel, P., & Haughian, P. L. (1999). Interactive decision making 
factors considered by coaches of youth ice hockey during games. Journal of 
Teaching in Physical Education, 18, 290-311. Retrieved from 
http://journals.humankinetics.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/jtpe-back-
77 
 
 
 77 
issues/JTPEVolume18Issue3April/InteractiveDecisionMakingFactorsConsider
edbyCoachesofYouthIceHockeyDuringGames  
Gilbert, D. W., & Trudel, P. (2001). Learning to coach through experience: Reflection 
in model youth sport coaches. Journal of Teaching in Physical Education, 
21(1), 16-34. Retrieved from 
http://journals.humankinetics.com.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/AcuCustom/Siten
ame/Documents/DocumentItem/4219.pdf  
Gordon, J. (1994, July-August). Some thoughts on sideline coaching. Soccer 
Journal, 39(4), 33.  
Harvey, S., Lyle, J., & Muir, B. (2015). Naturalistic decision making in high 
performance team sport coaching. International Sport Coaching Journal, 2(2), 
152-168. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/10.1123/iscj.2014-0118 
Heil, J., & Soter, P. (2009). Sports science: Stripside coaching. American Fencing 
Magazine, 22.  
Holyoak, J. K. (1984). Mental models in problem solving. In R. J. Anderson & M. S. 
Kosslyn (Ed.), Tutorials in Learning and Memory. San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman and Company. 
Johnson-Laird, N. P. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of 
language, inference and consciousness. Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kellogg, T. R. (2007). Fundamentals of cognitive psychology. USA: Sage 
Publications. 
Klein, G. (2003). Intuition at work. New York: Doubleday. 
Klein, G. (2008). Naturalistic decision making. Human Factors: The Journal of the 
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 50(3), 456-460.  
Klein, G. (2009). The recognition-primed decision (RPD) model: Looking back, 
looking forward. In E. C. Zsambok & G. Klein (Ed.), Naturalistic decision 
making (pp. 285-292). New York: Routledge. 
78 
 
 
 78 
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & Clinton-Cirocco, A. (1986). Rapid Decision Making on 
the Fire Ground. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Human Factors 
Society - 30th Annual Meeting, Ohio. 
Klein, G., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D. (1989). Critical decision method for 
eliciting knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems. Man and Cybernetics, 
19(3), 462-472. doi: 10.1109/21.31053 
Kosslyn, M., Stephen. (1984). Mental representation. In K. M. Stephen & J. R. 
Anderson, (Ed.), Tutorials in learning and memory (pp. 91-117). San 
Fancisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
Launder, A., & Piltz, W. (1999). Becoming a better bench coach: part 2: coaching in 
the game. Paper presented at the Sports Coach Conference.  
Lipshitz, R. (1993). Converging themes in the study of decision making in realistic 
settings. In G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu, R. Calderwood, & C. E. Zsambok (Eds.), 
Decision making in action: Models and methods (pp. 103-137). Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex. 
Lipshitz, R., Klein, G., Orasanu, J., & Salas, E. (2001). Focus article: Taking stock of 
naturalistic decision making. Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 14, 331-
352.  
Lipshitz, R., & Shaul, O. B. (2009). Schemata and mental models in recognition-
primed decision making. In C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic 
Decision Making (pp. 293-303). New York: Routledge. 
Lyle, J. (2002). Sports coaching concepts: A framework for coaches' behaviour. New 
York: Routledge. 
Lyle, J. (2003). Stimulated recall: A report on its use in naturalistic research. British 
Educational Research Journal, 29(6), 861-878. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/stable/1502138?pq-
origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents  
Lyle, J. (2010). Coaches' decision making: A naturalistic decision making analysis. In 
J. Lyle & C. Cushion (Eds.), Sports Coaching: Professionalisation and 
Practice (pp. 27-41). London: Elsevier. 
79 
 
 
 79 
Lyle, J., & Vergeer, I. (2013). Recommendations on the methods used to investigate 
coaches' decision making. In P. Potrac, D. W. Gilbert, & J. Denison (Eds.), 
Routledge Handbook of Sports Coaching (pp. 141-152). New York: 
Routledge. 
Macquet, A. C. (2009). Recognition within the decision-making process: A case 
study of expert volleyball players. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, 21, 
64-79. doi: 10.1080/10413200802575759 
Mallett, J. C., Rossi, T., & Tinning, R. (2007). Coaching knowledge, learning and 
mentoring in the AFL (Australian Football League). The University of 
Queensland: School of Human Movement Studies.  
Oxenham, D. (1998). Match Day. Rugby league coaching magazine, 6, 4-5. 
Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluation and research methods (2nd ed.). London: 
Sage Publications. 
Pliske, R., & Klein, G. (2003). The naturalistic decision making perspective. In L. S. 
Schneider (Ed.), Emerging perspectives on judgment and decision research 
(pp. 559-585). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Regehr, G., & Norman, R. G. (1996). Issues in cognitive psychology: Implications for 
professional education. Academic Medicine, 71(9). doi: 10.1097/00001888-
199609000-0 
Roos, P. (2011, March 26). The golden rules of afl coaching. Herald Sun. Retrieved 
from http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/the-golden-rules-of-afl-coaching  
Ross, G. K., Shafer, L. J., & Klein, G. (2006). Professional judgements and 
naturalistic decision making. In K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness, J. P. Feltovich, & 
R. R. Hoffman (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert 
Performance (pp. 403-420). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Schmidt, A. R. (1975), A schema theory of discrete motor skill learning. 
Psychological Review, 82(4), 225-260 
Schmidt, A. R., & Wrisberg, A. C. (2000). Motor learning and performance: A 
situation-based learning approach (4th ed.). United States: Human Kinetics 
80 
 
 
 80 
Sheahan, M. (2011, August 12). AFL coach wages top $25 million. Herald Sun. 
Retrieved from http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/afl-coaching-wages-top-
25-million/story-e6frf9jf-1226113441359  
Smith, M., & Cushion, C. J. (2006). An investigation of the in-game behaviours of 
professional, top-level youth soccer coaches. Journal of Sports Sciences, 
24(4), 355-366. doi: 10.1080/02640410500131944 
Tesch, R. (1990). Qualitative Reserach: Analysis Types and Software Tools. New 
York: The Falmer Press. 
Thomas, D. R. (2006). A general inductive approach for analysing qualitative 
evaluation data. American Journal of Evaluation, 27(2), 237-246. doi: 
10.1177/1098214005283748 
Thorndike, W. P. (1984). Applications of schema theory in cognitive research. In R. 
J. Anderson & M. Kosslyn, Stephen (Ed.), Tutorials in learning and memory. 
San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
Trudel, P., Côté, J., & Bernard, D. (1996). Systematic observation of youth ice 
hockey coaches during games. Journal of Sport Behaviour, 19(1), 355-366. 
doi: 10.1080/02640410500131944 
Witham, J. (2011). AFL's $1.25 billion broadcast deal. Retrieved from 
Zsambok, E. C. (2009). Naturalistic decision making: Where are we now? In E. C. 
Zsambok & G. Klein (Ed.), Naturalistic decision making (pp. 3-16). New York: 
Routledge. 
http://www.afl.com.au/news/newsarticle/tabid/208/newsid/112560/default.aspx 
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 81 
Appendix A  
 
 
 
82 
 
 
 82 
Appendix B 
 
83 
 
 
 83 
Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
